Results

The project will result in a number of reports that can be used for planning and training: field study reports, a booklet of European examples of good practice for dialogue and communication as strategic principles for policing political manifestations, research reports and a paper on peer-review methodology. Through these activities a European dimension of policing crowds at political manifestation will emerge.

A final conference will also be organised in Stockholm in the first half of 2013. All the partners as well as other international experts will be invited to the conference to discuss the project results and findings.

Contact email for the GODIAC project is rikspolisstyrelsen@polisen.se.

ESSAY: THE EVOLUTION OF THE HOME AFFAIRS POLICY AREA AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING: (N)EVER CLOSER UNION?

By

STEFANO FAILLA, Dott., External Relations Officer, European Police College

Introduction

The European Union has indeed gone far in giving itself institutions and bodies tasked with addressing various policy areas in which the Member States have chosen to cooperate and delegate sovereignty to varying degrees. The policy area of Home Affairs, which essentially addresses the issues of Security and Migration, is one of the most recent; while cooperation began more than 30 years ago through mechanisms of informal cooperation and information exchange networks, it has only recently become more in line with the “Community Method” as we had known it under the previous institutional (pre-Lisbon) configuration.

Moreover, this area has a gained a tremendous prominence in recent years both in terms of the political agenda and in terms of its relevance in the domestic debates within Mem-
ber States; European integration has moved into areas which Member States feel as their basic prerogative: the provision of security.

In this context, law enforcement training as one of the ways by which European integration in the home affairs area can be achieved is a topic that needs to be analysed not only from a technical or scientific perspective, but also from a policy one. One of the purposes of this paper is an attempt to draw some preliminary conclusions on the state of affairs in this sector, and point out some of the more immediate challenges for and around law enforcement training.

Positions around Home Affairs issues appear however to be polarized in a manner which is not factual and even misleading: the pro-European rhetoric and its mantra somehow exaggerate the actual powers of the Union in this area on the one hand and often adopt resounding written statements of intent which are difficult if not impossible to apply in practice; on the other hand, the flag-wavers of national interest utilize the limitations and shortfalls of the EU (which obviously do exist) and use it to label the entire EU apparatus as a bureaucratic monster, hungry for more power, led by unelected technocrats and ontologically inefficient, thus making it the obvious scapegoat for all that is wrong in Europe at any given time. The result is the revival of populism and the withdrawal within national borders, which is exactly what the Union was founded to avoid. In the latter optic, multilateralism and Union-level instruments of law enforcement cooperation are just means to utilise occasionally as long as they are functional (or often subordinated) to the immediate national interest, while EU funding is perceived as a way to achieve national objectives with European money.

Truth evidently lies in none of these two extremes. With this paper, I intend to explore to what extent the "Integration Fatigue", which seems to have become almost an open insufferableness vis-à-vis the idea of an Ever Closer Union, has affected the Home Affairs policy area and its sub-areas. I will point out that a revision of EU mechanisms and even of the Treaties may be necessary; in a dedicated section, I will also try to outline the implications - and possible risks - associated with the ongoing debate over the future of European law enforcement training in light of Lisbon, the Internal Security Strategy and the Stockholm Programme. The attempts to strike a balance between an EU which is effective and one which is based on consensus has proven inadequate, in the eyes of many, to tackle the challenges of a world characterised by deeper and deeper interdependence.

The main question underpinning this paper remains whether, in the area of home affairs and in some of its specific articulations, we have actually got so close to the core of na-
tional sovereignty that new decision making mechanisms will have to be devised - or whether a regress to purely intergovernmental dynamics is instead appearing on the horizon. While circumstances suggest that the current model of integration has shown most of its limits in the sphere of home affairs, I will argue that there is still room for gradual progress in applying the existing instruments, perhaps rendering some of them more compatible with the former 1st Pillar decision making and model of administration before a further delegation of sovereignty by Member States is necessary. However, I will in parallel argue that, in order for the EU to be a real and effective player in the area of global security, such further delegation of sovereignty will in the near future be necessary, and that a significant forward leap is advisable even at this very stage in some selected areas of the policy domain under examination. This is evidenced when we look at the home affairs area from both an external and internal perspective: Europe will either step up to the challenge, or step off.

Brave New World, Not-So-Brave Institutions?

On 1 January 2011, the new European External Action Service (EEAS) of the European Union came into existence after a long and much debated incubation phase which featured extensive negotiations between Member States, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. It was, undoubtedly, a major institutional development, possibly the most relevant reshuffling within the EU institutional architecture for decades.

The EU has given itself a new structure, a sui-generis Service which lies somewhere between an Institution and an Agency, whose staff is a mixture of the various staff types which populate the European public administration: permanent and temporary officials, contractual agents, national diplomats and seconded national experts; The new EEAS is meant to give more "punch" to the stated political aspirations of the EU as a political community and as a global power; among its functions is also the projection of the EU acquis in the area of justice and home affairs, which has become a policy area of growing significance since the Maastricht Treaty first formalized its existence as a domain of European integration.

However, the political profile of the EU during these first few months of a very torment- ed 2011 has been minimalistic to say the least. Four months which have seen natural catastrophes accompanied by an unseen wave of political turmoil in the Middle East (including a military intervention), measured against the already grim landscape of continued conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and waves of irregular migration are scaring Europeans and their governments. Growing international crime and its financial and po-
itical consequences, an ever galloping eco-
nomic crises which has shaken the very
lifestyle of Europeans, and a growing dis-
affection towards an EU which is schizo-
phrenically accused of being a gigantic bu-
reaucratic monster with Federalist ambi-
tions and at the same time of being inca-
ble of making itself be heard in times of cri-
sis, are pushing the European integration
paradigm as we have known it so far deep
into a corner.

The European Commission Directorate-
General for Home Affairs (DG HOME) was
created on 1 July 2010 from the division of
former DG Justice, Freedom and Security
(DG JLS) into two Directorates-General, a
move determined by the growing im-
portance of policies related to this area in
the work of the Union and the need for fur-
ther specialisation and better division of
labor - and a move which inherently recogn-
sises the need to develop, in parallel to
greater security integration, a stronger ap-
proach to the safeguard of fundamental
rights (for which the new Directorate Gen-
eral for Justice is responsible).

DG HOME focuses (in its own words) on
two main priorities: ensuring European se-
curity and working towards an effective
European migration policy encompassing
the principle of solidarity. The Stockholm
Programme 2010/2014 and its Action Plan
constitute the main policy documents to
implement these priorities, which of course
include law enforcement cooperation in the
fight against crime and in particular or-
organised crime. The mission statement of DG
HOME specifically recognises that all home
affairs policies have two dimensions, an
internal and an external one; for this very
reason the Directorate-General places great
emphasis on enhancing dialogue and coop-
eration with third countries, to strengthen
the position of the Union as an effective,
active and reliable global player. Far from
being solely a policy player, DG HOME
manages a not negligible portion of the EU
budget devoted to this area, amounting to
approximately 6500 million euros, mostly
however dedicated to migration, with over
749 million euros devoted to security.

The EEAS and DG HOME are of course on-
ly two of the key actors which help deter-
mine and execute the collective will of the
EU; while the impact of DG HOME can be
evaluated on the basis of its longer track
record, it is indeed very early to even
attempt a first evaluation of the EEAS’ im-
 pact on EU foreign policy, including the
external aspects of Home Affairs.

The signs are, however, not really encour-
aging at this stage: for example, the recent
nominations (2010) of a significant number
of heads of EU delegations, the first operat-
ed under the Lisbon framework, caused
significant media concerns over the exces-
sive politicisation of the appointments,
with many national diplomats
"parachuted" to delegations which seemed
to be too immediately identifiable with the
sensing state’s foreign policy interests rather than dictated by competence or aptitude. As delegations manage a significant amount of EU cooperation funds (many dedicated to building the capacity of beneficiary country law enforcement agencies, both in terms of soft and hard assistance), this raised concern over a possible politicization of external aid.

In spite of this, the historical role of EU delegations (which were detached offices of the European Commission until Lisbon) has largely been a positive one also in the sphere of home affairs: in the area of enlargement, programmes such as PHARE, CARDS and IPA have contributed significantly in helping candidate countries fulfill the political criteria set out in 1993 in Copenhagen, which includes the creation of stable institutions capable of upholding the rule of law. Through the years, a plethora of EU advisers have been deployed in third countries under the umbrella of technical assistance projects managed by the Commission such as the Police Assistance Mission of the European Community to Albania (PAMECA), Council-led missions such as the various operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA, EUPAT etc), or “hybrid” operations such as EUBAM in Moldova and Ukraine. The vast majority of these non-military operations had the nature of integrated Rule of Law/Security Sector Reform projects with a significant training component. PAMECA for example had, in its latest II and III editions, a specific portion of its budget dedicated to criminal investigations (with a prosecutor attached to the mission team heading the criminal justice component) or civilian/military cooperation with an expert tasked with reinforcing civilian control over maritime borders.

While not all of these projects or operations can be regarded as fully successful, they clearly indicate that home affairs has become increasingly important in the EU’s external action, and that training and education have gained a fundamental relevance in the way the Union projects itself out of its geographical borders.

Taking a look at home affairs and its external projection represents a useful starting point to examine how the EU struggles to find a new balance in the post-Lisbon environment, as well as a general indication of the EU’s prospective successes and failures in this area. An examination of home affairs and some of its specific sub-sectors also provide an opportunity to highlight strengths and weaknesses in what is often referred to as the “new European security architecture” in a changing world characterised by the fact that internal and external security are deeply intertwined.

**Home Affairs: from Intergovernmentalism to the Community legal order**

It would be profoundly unfair, and even scientifically inexact, to downplay the importance of Lisbon in bringing justice and
home affairs in line with the general policy and lawmaking process of the Union. While many of the concrete effects and their magnitude are yet to materialize, progress is nevertheless evident in a historical perspective. When we examine, if briefly, the evolution of this policy area since the Treaty of Maastricht, we cannot help but realise the magnitude of the changes it introduced into our everyday lives; free movements of people within the Union being possibly the most visible of these changes. By taking a look at the early stages and the development of cooperation in this policy area, I will attempt to identify the tension between the perceived need to closely cooperate on one hand, and the reluctance to do so when Member States perceive a potential impact on sovereignty- or much more simply, when they perceive a loss of control over the decision making process over issues which are deemed closer to the "reserved domains" of Member States, notably security. A brief study of the early stages of home affairs integration will also highlight that those very tensions are far from gone, and they are in fact one of the key factors today preventing Europe from acting with one voice - or at least in vocal harmony - on internal and external security issues. The underpinning theme which can be derived from the available sources on the work of TREVI (mostly reports to parliamentary committees and a lesser number of other public documents) is that while cooperation is indeed desirable, the prevailing tendency remained to favour intergovernmentalism and informality over the Community legal order even after the official introduction of the JHA policy area into the competence of the EU.

The blueprint for integration in the home affairs policy area is normally identified with the work of the TREVI Group created in December 1975 in Rome by the European Council, when Justice and Interior Ministry senior officials started gathering informally or on a "network" basis, at the margins of the EU to share information primarily on terrorism (sources related that the acronym itself stood in French for Terrorism, Radicalisation, Extremism and International Violence) as a reaction to an outburst of terrorist attacks affecting then Western Europe. While the concrete achievements of TREVI are rather difficult to measure due to the secrecy of its proceedings and outcomes (the existence of the group itself was not publicly revealed until 1989 with the Palma document), it had two noticeable effects, the first one being the "sparking" of a debate over how to best cooperate at the European level on questions inherent to justice and security by bringing for the first time those issues into the European agenda, at least procedurally; the second being the initiation of a slow spillover effect as TREVI expanded its competence (or rather, its interests) to wider
issues such as transnational security threats including organised crime.

It is interesting to note that TREVI functioned fundamentally on an intergovernmental basis through a structure of working groups underpinned by a secure fax communications system and included, inter alia, a working group on police training (disbanded in 1992, its work redistributed) and an ad-hoc group on EUROPOL was founded in 1992. These latter two groups could be considered as the historical precursors to EUROPOL of course, and CEPOL as well (which retained, to a great extent, the "networking" character of its early predecessor). TREVI's structure, though largely informal and intergovernmental, was far from minimalistic; it included in fact five working groups, respectively on terrorism (group 1), scientific and technical knowledge including police training (group 2); air transportation security (group 3, which in 1985 was restructured and its role redefined to take charge of aspects relating to organized crime and drug trafficking); nuclear safety and security (group 4); civil emergency (natural disasters and firefighting). Of these, only two were active since the inception of TREVI, notably groups 1 and 2, group 3 started working in 1985 under its new configuration, while groups 4 and 5 never met.

Particularly worthy of notice is the work of group 3, if not in terms of concrete deliverables, at least in terms of the themes it dealt with and the contribution it has given to closer formal integration.

Group 3 was in fact given the competence to deal with many of the issues which have either been later incorporated into the former Third Pillar and the policy remit of DG Home Affairs, or have become the competence of EUROPOL from an operational (not executive) perspective.

Very interestingly, the Commission was invited to participate as observers to TREVI proceedings only from 1992 onwards; often, only to sections of the proceedings and in particular those held at a ministerial level every six months. The formalisation or incorporation of TREVI into stable EU structures had to wait until the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht, with the period 1992-1994 being a transitional one leading to the new pillar institutional architecture. Amsterdam and Lisbon changed of course the landscape, even dramatically.

After Lisbon: Working or Networking?
Those readers familiar with the current set-up of home affairs within the European institutions will for sure realise how far the Union has gone from the TREVI days.

These informal mechanisms have now been largely replaced either by creating new services within the European Commission or by delegating some of the tasks to executive and regulatory EU agencies staffed by a mixture of permanent, temporary or national seconded officials.
Some have argued that while networks are essentially preferable to hierarchical organizations and this is particularly true in the private sector or in highly technological environments, they are less suited to satisfy the needs (both operational and administrative) of public administration, which acts according to the principles of authority, leadership, and accountability; while this may or may not be among the key considerations that have led to the creation of agencies such as EUROPOL or FRONTEX, it is indeed a fact that this is what the landscape of home affairs has become in the European Union - and it is not because of the twisted aspirations of Eurobureaucrats wanting to create layers and layers of administration one on top of another; it is simply a natural dynamic that networks, as...networking intensifies and becomes a daily feature, needs to evolve into some form of more permanent structure which is able to supply the necessary degree of support, continuity and adherence to sector policies for its constituent elements. The conversion of CEPOL from an essentially intergovernmental network based on an "associative" model into a fully-fledged EU agency is one of the examples of this; EUROPOL being another more recent one.

However, as recent events have shown, the “days of wine and roses” are yet to be forthcoming. The new powers afforded to EU institutions have not yet translated into a more coherent action on the ground. Actually, recent and current events indicate a certain degree of incapability of the EU to even apply those powers it already had prior to the changes introduced by Lisbon. Serious challenges still lay ahead, and the institutions themselves are still finding their own place - and a new modus vivendi - in the new political amphitheater that home affairs has become; while the co-decision procedure and qualified majority voting (with the noticeable exception of operational policing and the opt-outs of certain Member States) have now become the default decision mechanism for almost all policy areas, thus giving new powers to block or amend legislation on the side of the European Parliament, this mechanism appears to have become more and more often an occasion for institutions to flex their muscles; in addition, the preferred voting mechanism in the Council remains consensus, and the current rules do not encourage the disclosure of individual Member State positions. Already in February 2010, the European Parliament blocked the so-called Swift agreement between Europe and the US; it was approved only in July of the same year with substantial modification which however left many disappointed with some of its provisions which do not appear to be in line with EU data protection and privacy standards. While Lisbon was supposed to provide the famous “telephone number for Europe” which Henry Kissinger asked for more than 30
years ago, there is still a wide degree of discontent versus the issue of speaking with one voice in international fora when security matters are discussed. The noticeable absence of a unified position on the crisis in Libya from the side of the EU is indeed a matter of concern, if we assume that the aspirations of the EU as a political entity go beyond expressing concern and consulting with stakeholders. The role of the permanent President and that of the High Representative for Foreign and Security policy are still much overshadowed by the role of the rotating presidency on one side, and of the European Commission on the other. The role of the EU home affairs agencies has surely grown in significance, but they are yet to be given the powers and the resources to be effective actors.

Ultimately, in spite of the renewed institutional framework and array of strategies elaborated to concretise the idea of a “European Security Model”, the anticipated “leap forward” is not yet visible. The operationalisation of the elaborated policy instruments appears to be painstakingly slow; a certain lack of substance in those documents would seem to indicate that consolidating the existing achievements shall be a more realistic target than embarking in new initiatives; however, recent debates over the inflow of refugees from the Middle East seems to indicate that even the Schengen Agreement (a pillar of one of the Four Freedoms on which the post-Maastricht Europe was built upon) is at serious risk.

The challenges and implications for European law enforcement training

Again, taking a look at the history and pre-history of the home affairs policy area indicates a clear trend of integration from many angles going from informal and intergovernmental to formalised and "communitarised" cooperation; from networks to a web of specialised agencies dealing with one or the other specialist field.

The simple change in the official language in EU documents as well as the denomination of some of its administrations. Whoever has ever handled any document with EUROPOL letterhead will immediately notice that while the official name in the EUROPOL Council Decision includes the word Police, the organization chooses to identify itself as the European Law Enforcement office). This denotes a shift that is at the same time operational and cultural. In many instances, and especially in the context of security, the word "police" has been substituted with the words "law enforcement". Not casually, the Stockholm Programme explicitly utilises the word "Law Enforcement Training Scheme" to indicate the set of skills, knowledge and values which should form the common grounds for (again) a genuine European law enforcement culture. When reading the recently approved EU Internal Security Strategy (Council of the EU, February 2010), one would be relatively sur-
prised to even find the word "police" in the
text- it is actually mentioned four times,
versus 22 references to law enforcement.
A semantic or historical dissertation on the
differences and similarities is way beyond
the scope of this paper, which intends to
remain mostly a policy one and not a re-
search one; in addition, while the expres-
sion is understood across jurisdictions in
an intuitive manner, in fact it cannot be
translated with the same impact as its
"older sister" in many languages; for in-
stance, it is hardly possible to translate it
into French or Italian. For the purpose at
hand, it will suffice to say that law en-
forcement refers to that area of security which
encompasses, in functional terms, the
maintenance of public peace and order as
well as the investigation and prosecution
of crime; in organisational terms, it is nor-
mally understood as encompassing the po-
lace, customs, correctional services, border
police or border guards, as well as the se-
curity services insofar as they deal with
crimes which are also a national security
threat. The prosecution services are nor-
mally excluded from this categorisation as
they are often part of a distinct and autono-
mous order, whose independence is en-
shrined within national constitutions or
basic laws; however, it is without a doubt
that functionally speaking, it is hard not to
include them, as their work is closely inter-
twined with those of the "proper" law en-
forcement agencies, which in turn are often
hierarchically or functionally subordinated
to them in the performance of criminal in-
vestigations. Other providers of security as
a service to the citizenry, such as the pri-
ivate sector and certain social services are
normally excluded from this categorisa-
tion, as the "enforcement" component of
this term normally refers to the exercise of
coercive force, an element which is present
in those actors to a much lesser extent. This
however does not prevent us from involv-
ing those and other actors in a dialogue on
law enforcement training, research and edu-
cation, which must be more inclusive. The
term "Police" has also of course evolved
through the centuries, and even though in
many EU Member States police services
are in fact complex agencies involving
multiple components and even contain se-
curity services or fire brigades within their
organizational structures, it still denotes
fundamentally those services tasked with
the maintenance of public order and the
investigation of crime.

A certain degree of confusion and assimila-
tion between the two is not only under-
standable, but will remain for some time.
However, it is becoming more clear, at the
European level, that the policy accents are
being increasingly put on the concept of
law enforcement as an integrated area, in
line with the working definition I have just
highlighted; and while, again, some may
be led to believe that the difference lies on-
ly in the semantics, the shift from police to
law enforcement is far from insignificant and is absorbing most of the cooperation efforts at the EU as well as the wider multilateral level. This of course is underpinned by the fact that our policy makers have realized - individually or institutionally - that as threats to the security of our states comes in multiple forms; the obvious response would sound more or less like "fighting organised crime through organised legality".

It is the job of our security structures - however we choose to call them - to adapt to reality, and not the other way around.

From the viewpoint of training design and delivery, there have been multiple signs of change through the years. Joint training sessions between police and prosecutors are becoming more and more frequent if not the norm, also given the growth of the role of the prosecutor in the management and conduct of investigations even in common law jurisdictions; the expression "Police polices, Prosecutors Prosecute" has become more and more obsolete if not irrelevant.

Customs and police cooperation have become the cornerstone of integrated border management, which is in turn one of the key EU policies at home and abroad; even in the UK, which cherishes its well-functioning, tried-and-tested law enforcement architecture, the Immigration Service has become the UK Border Service and a National Crime Intelligence organisation has been created already years ago (NCIS, later SOCA). Financial intelligence units across Europe have often evolved into fully fledged law enforcement agencies with powers of judicial police.

At the EU level, as highlighted by the Director of CEPOL in his speech to the High Level conference on the future of European Law Enforcement Training in Brussels (18 May 2011), the creation of multiple legal and operational instruments with a distinct integrated outlook has grown significantly in the past few years and gives a very clear indication of the choices Europe has already collectively made, though not yet put fully into practice.

Critics of this approach would normally contend that police training at the EU level, of which CEPOL is the natural and historical prime actor, already features the participation of several agencies and are inherently multidisciplinary in their nature. While this thesis could be shared (to an extent), it remains without doubt that both CEPOL and European law enforcement training remain essentially police-centred in their decision making mechanism, conceptual approach, scope and target groups of the activities.

It is reasonable to estimate that opening the doors to the new training policy directions decided collectively by the EU, and specifically the design and implementa-
tion of a European law enforcement training scheme (once its outline and general content is identified) will indeed require much more work than simply extending more invitations to outsiders; it will require a new and somehow revolutionised approach both in conceptual and organisational terms; in spite of the well-known fact that law enforcement methodologies, approaches and skills are and will of course remain fundamentally characterized by national dynamics, the EU law enforcement official of 2030 will have a much different profile, and presumably, a new package of skills, knowledge and behaviours which will be much more harmonized with those of his colleagues across the continent.

One of the fields in which the necessity to create of a more harmonized European law enforcement professional culture is indeed evident is civilian crisis management, as I briefly touched upon in previous paragraphs. Police officers from the EU have been deployed around the globe in their thousands for many years; their tasks are now becoming less and less those of observers and increasingly identified with those of mentors and trainers for local police and law enforcement officers in the host countries or areas. The scope of EU "Peacekeeping" has expanded to include civil administration, police, military, and civil emergency; civilian crisis management missions are assuming the default shape of rule of law missions, such as those in Kosovo (with a strength of almost 3000 personnel) and Iraq or Afghanistan; in those missions which remain essentially military ones such as the anti-piracy operation off the Somali coast (EUNAVFOR, with almost 1500 troops deployed) have significant civilian implications.

However, while a multiplicity of actors is already involved in pre-deployment training for law enforcement officers about to be dispatched to missions, there is no systematic approach at the EU level to equip those officers with a harmonized set of skills and values in order to ensure that EU policies, which especially senior mission staff is called to implement, are applied consistently across the board. In addition, the various missions are at the moment left alone in devising and implementing post-induction training for field staff. While the use of "Lessons Identified" is indeed increasing within the former Council units now transferred "en bloc" to the EEAS, there seems to be a lack of a unified approach in recascading those lessons back to the field and incorporating them into the mission planning process. European law enforcement training necessarily will have to take into account the above scenarios.

Consequences this cultural shift from police to law enforcement can also be reasonably expected to affect the somehow still mysterious domain of police science, de-
fined in 2007 by CEPOL as "the scientific study of Police as an Institution and Policing as a Process" (Final Report- Perspectives of Police Science in Europe). If we accept the principle that, at the European level, the emphasis shall be placed on law enforcement, the consequences may go beyond the semantics; at a minimum, this may require expanding the field of research and study to a wider range of disciplines and institutions, with an emphasis on the plural.

The question of whether all existing police academies in the Member States are either equipped or prepared at a comparable level for such a step, is another issue for debate: while many academies have for years embraced a scientific approach mixing education, research and training, others remain essentially training institutions (within the meaning outlined the CEPOL Glossary in 2005); while certain academies have the possibility of acting as a "focal point" bringing together all or most of the law enforcement community for the purpose of devising training strategies and products, it is realistic to believe that many others do not have the capacity or the mandate to do so. To the same end, the ongoing debate over the future of European law enforcement training may imply a recasting of the CEPOL decision to render the agency more apt at translating EU policy into practice, building of course on the achievements of the past, but giving itself a new governance and programming platform. In particular, a renewed drive for innovation and a faster and more efficient capacity to conceive and implement programmes shall be given proper consideration.

Of course, the changes described above cannot happen overnight and will not happen without some sort of stimulus, taking into consideration the inclusion of a much wider range of contributors to the conception of programmes and a much wider target audience benefiting from European schemes, again in line with the "predictions" of CEPOL in the study previously referred to (p.148), for example mixing law enforcement and non-law enforcement students; as well as other categories identified in the Stockholm Programme). The time to start preparations is now- if indeed the collective will remains that of a European Union funded on collective security.

**Conclusions: towards a real Political Entity on Security issues?**

It is self-evident that the European Union can only be what its Member States want it to be – this is a truth that not even the most fervent Eurofederalist could ever deny. Human society has not yet devised another form of organization which is more suited than nation states; it has however progressed so much in terms of making sure that all these
nation states are tied together in a web of relations which, in the majority of the cases, forces them to act according to commonly accepted behaviours. Furthermore, post-1945 institutions such as the United Nations have created a new series of customary and codified legal norms and instruments which regulate the peaceful existence of communities. The question for Europe is whether this is enough, and the question is even more urgent when discussing security, one of the fundamental human needs at societal and individual level. Furthermore, a matter of values is also involved here; and values are also, if not primarily, transmitted through training and education.

The EU is indeed the creation of the independent and sovereign will of its Member States. But the corollary to this statement of facts is that sovereignty can be limited and portions of it delegated to a superior or external entity; it can indeed be a scary perspective for many, and the full implications of it are not fully understood until they are actually put to the test. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the mechanism will actually work: like all forms of societal organizations, cohesion and survival are assured by a mix of adherence to written norms, spontaneous self-constraint and a belief in the inherent values of the society we elect to join. Yes, it does imply a leap of faith, and like citizenship at its best, it requires full participation. “Decisions are taken by those who show up”, in the words of Josiah Bartlett, a famous fictional American president interpreted on screen by actor Martin Sheen.

While there are many intermediate steps yet to be taken before the EU can say for certain that another revision of the Treaties is necessary, the signs are there already - they just need to be read with an open mind. The risk of not doing so is to revert to pre-Maastricht scenarios or even worse, creating a "Europe on Paper" made up of rhetorical statements and no drive towards the Ever Closer Union designed by our founding fathers. An EU that exists only on paper, given the current threats of economic decline, security challenges and continued internal fragmentation on fundamental political and operational choices, and being the EU hostage of turf wars between its institutions and menaced by the revamping of intergovernmentalist tendencies, is perhaps more damaging that a Europe which actually functions as it is currently designed to- with all its imperfections.