

Policing low level public disorder, antisocial behaviour and alcohol-related crime: from the metropolis to the tourist resort

R.I. Mawby
United Kingdom



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Introduction ⁽¹⁾

The very nature of *public* disorder means that it has always been a key component of the everyday work of the police, but the nature of public disorder varies markedly. It incorporates terrorism and politically motivated 'single incidents', riots and mass protest, and violence and disorder associated with mass events like the football World Cup or Olympic Games. However, in most countries the police are more regularly engaged in low level street disorder. The maintenance of order on the streets has long been regarded as one of the main priorities of policing (Wilson 1968), and its successful implementation may prevent isolated incidents escalating into more widespread disorder. This resonates, albeit in a rather different direction, through more recent US and British interest in zero tolerance policing, where punitive policing of public nuisances is alleged to prevent minor offenders gravitating to more serious crime (Kelling and Coles 1996; Innes 1999).

In the UK a number of government initiatives have addressed various dimensions of public disorder. For example antisocial behaviour (Burney 2009; Millie 2008; Millie et al 2005) ⁽¹⁾ and alcohol-related crime (Dingwall 2011; Secretary of State for the Home

Department 2012) ⁽²⁾ have been prioritised. However, while antisocial behaviour clearly comprises many elements of public disorder, the terms are distinct. Essentially, antisocial behaviour incorporates two dimensions: the way people behave inappropriately in public (e.g. people being drunk or rowdy in public places), and the consequences of that behaviour for the environment (e.g. vandalism, graffiti and other deliberate damage to property). From a policing perspective, the former constitutes public disorder but the latter only sometimes and when the act is ongoing. For example, the act of setting fire to a car is clearly a matter of public order but the consequence, the burnt out car, is not.

Equally, many of the items listed as antisocial behaviour involve alcohol or drug misuse, but not all alcohol or drug related crime can be described as involving public disorder (Budd 2003; Dingwall 2011; Matthews and Richardson 2005; Richardson and Budd 2003). For example, alcohol or drug consumption may lead to other offences, such as burglary, that are unrelated to public disorder, whilst excessive alcohol consumption

⁽¹⁾ See also The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, accessed 25/05/16 at <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/anti-social-behaviour-crime-and-police-bill>

⁽²⁾ See also: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-harmful-drinking/2010-to-2015-government-policy-harmful-drinking>, accessed 25/05/16. In 2014 the government also established 20 local alcohol action areas to tackle the harmful effects of irresponsible drinking, particularly alcohol-related crime and disorder, accessed 25/05/16 at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/278742/LAAAs.pdf

and its consequences may be confined to private space. ⁽³⁾ In the latter context it is worth noting that urban violence in the night-time economy tends to occur in public areas around licensed premises rather than in the licensed premises themselves (Hobbs 2005). However, while public concern over alcohol-related disorder is considerable (Walker et al 2009), fuelled by debates over more flexible licensing arrangements (see Crime Prevention and Community Safety: an international journal 2009), the focus has been almost exclusively on metropolitan locations.

Nevertheless, locations away from the big cities may evidence high levels of public disorder, and present particular problems for the police. One that has remained largely absent from British government debates is the extent of disorder, especially alcohol misuse, in tourist resorts. This is particularly surprising, given an established body of research that demonstrates a close association between tourism and crime (Brunt and Hambly 1999; Pizam and Mansfeld 1996; Ryan 1993). Research suggests that many tourists areas experience relatively high levels of crime and disorder, and that within such areas the routine activities of tourists may lead to them committing crimes (Andrews 2011; Bellis et al 2000; Cohen 1980; Homel et al 1997; Prideaux 1996), becoming the victims of crime (Chesney-Lind and Lind 1986; Mawby, Brunt and Hambly 1999; Michalko 2003; Stangeland 1998), or both. Of course, not all tourist areas are associated with high levels of crime and disorder. The nature of the tourist area has a direct impact upon crime rates and patterns, with those mass resorts marketed at younger tourists evidencing the greatest public disorder problems (Andrews 2011; Bellis et al 2000; Prideaux (1996).

The issue is, from a policing perspective, complex. Residents of major tourist areas are generally critical of the extent to which tourism generates crime and disorder problems (Davis et al 1988; Haralambopoulos and Pizam 1996; King et al 1993; Ross 1992). Demonstrations in 2009 by residents of the British

youth tourist destination, Newquay, provide a graphic illustration of this (Mawby 2012). Similarly, recent demonstrations by residents of Barcelona against unruly behaviour by tourists, including Italian youths creating disturbances in the streets, has led the mayor to curtail tourist development. ⁽⁴⁾ But those involved in the tourism business, such as hoteliers, leisure industry managers, employees whose jobs depend on tourism etc., may be far more ambivalent. Tourist areas do not spontaneously emerge as centres of the club scene, locations where sex and alcohol are an expected part of the holiday 'package'; they are specifically marketed as such and targeted at groups within the population to whom such holidays appeal. In consequence, the police may find themselves policing a contested aspect of public behaviour, where the local public at large hold very different perceptions of appropriate policing from key local businesses – and possibly local government – whose prosperity has been built on precisely that image (Barton and James 2003; Mawby 2012).

This article focuses on the policing of public disorder in such contested areas, by using four examples from the academic and wider literature:

- The policing of street disturbances between 'mods' and 'rockers' in 60s' Brighton.
- Policing the 'schoolies' holidaying on Australia's Gold Coast.
- Responding to Amsterdam's reputation as a center of drugs and sex tourism.
- Faliraki revealed as the sex, drugs and alcohol destination for young people from Britain.
- In the light of these examples, the paper concludes with an evaluation of a range of policy options that have been considered.

⁽³⁾ <http://www.ias.org.uk/Alcohol-knowledge-centre/Crime-and-social-impacts/Factsheets/UK-alcohol-related-crime-statistics.aspx>, accessed 25/06/16, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/>, <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/crime-stats/crime-statistics/focus-on-violent-crime-and-sexual-offences--2013-14/sty-facts-about-alcohol-related-violence.htm>, accessed 25/06/16, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_394516.pdf, accessed 25/06/16

⁽⁴⁾ www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/21/naked-italians-protests-drunken-tourists-barcelona, www.travelmole.com/news_feature.php?c=setreg%2%aeion=3&m_id=Y%21Y%21_rT_T_mb&w_id=10423&news_id=2014023, accessed 25/06/16, www.travelmole.com/news_feature.php?c=setreg®ion=3&m_id=Y%21Y%21vT_Y%21T_m&w_id=31029&news_id=2017470, accessed 25/06/16

'Mods' and 'rockers' in 60s' Brighton

Stan Cohen's (1980) seminal work on the 'Mods and Rockers' conflicts in England described the convergence on South and East coast resorts in the 1960s of groups of working class youths, whose behaviour was perceived as a threat to the established social order. However, Cohen was more interested in the amplification process than on Mods and Rockers themselves. Nor does the research focus on tourism; rather, the example of public disorder, what Cohen (1980, 180) calls 'expressive fringe delinquency' at seaside resorts is coincidental; any other example of reactions to youth cultures might have been taken.

The scene of the first confrontation was Clacton, an East coast resort and traditional holiday weekend venue for working class youths from the East End of London. During an especially cold and wet Easter weekend in 1964, fighting broke out between groups of youths, some damage was done to beach huts, and windows were broken. Later confrontations occurred at resorts including Southend, Bournemouth, Brighton and Margate.

According to Cohen, the resorts at the centre of the Mods and Rockers drama had been traditional Bank holiday resorts for London's working classes. They also shared a certain shabbiness, having lost their traditional family holidaymakers to the Spanish Costas. Their facilities were meagre and overpriced and the youths went with the hope, rather than the expectation, that they would experience some excitement, whether this involved sex, drugs or 'aggro'. Following Downes (1966), Cohen saw their reaction as in part a response to the disjuncture between the leisure opportunities promised in the media and the reality of their situation as impoverished working class youths in dead-end and unrewarding jobs:

'All that was left was to make a gesture, to deliberately enter into risky situations where putting the boot in, throwing rocks around, dumping a girl into the sea, could be seen for what they were. Add to this volitional element the specific desires for change and freedom over the holidays, to get away from home, the romance of roughing it on the beaches or sleeping four to a room in a grotty seafront boarding-house, finding a bird, getting

some pills. One chose these things, but at the same time one was in a society whose structure had severely limited one's choice and one was in a situation where what deterministic forces there were – the lack of amenities, the action of the police, the hostility of locals – made few other choices possible (Cohen 1980, 183).

However, as already noted, Cohen's work emphasised societal reaction rather than explaining primary deviance. This was done in terms of concepts such as 'moral panic' and 'deviation amplification'. A moral panic is defined as where:

'A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible' (Cohen 1980, 9).

Cohen then used the concept 'deviation amplification' to explain 'how the societal reaction may in fact *increase* rather than decrease or keep in check the amount of deviance' (ibid., 18). Reaction to local conflict in resorts such as Brighton in part reflected concern over the changing nature of tourism in the area and a forlorn hope for a return to the past. But a localised conflict became redefined as a major social problem. The process whereby this occurred is illustrated by Cohen. For example:

- Fights between loosely formed street groups, some local, were re-interpreted as confrontations between gangs of Mods and Rockers who had converged on the resort from London with the avowed intention of confrontation.
- Essentially working class youths were redefined as affluent and drawn from a wide spectrum, with the assumption that their behaviour was typical of most youths.
- Deliberate intent was accredited in cases where in fact most '*young people present at the resorts came down not so much to make trouble as in the hope that there would be some trouble to watch*' (ibid., 36).
- The impact was exaggerated, both in terms of the costs of damage and the loss of revenue to the resort.

Cohen (1980, 77-143) then went on to assess societal reaction under three headings: sensitisation; the social control culture; and exploitation. Sensitisation referred to the way in which subsequent acts were interpreted and defined as further examples of the phenomenon; thus all resort conflicts and many examples of adolescent hooliganism were reclassified as Mods' and/or Rockers' activities. The societal control culture referred to political and penal response, with tougher policing, harsher sentences and disregard for due process, and clamours for draconian measures to stamp out the 'evil'. The exploitative culture referred to the ways in which various agencies used the inventory for their own ends; for example, by claiming more resources, identifying the moral value of their own organisation etc.

In summary, the process of amplification was seen to involve five stages: *initial deviance* leading to the *inventory* and *sensitisation* which fed back on each other to produce an *over-estimation* of the deviance, which in turn was used to justify an *escalation* in the control culture (ibid., 143).

While Cohen's work allows us to appreciate that disorder in seaside resorts is not a modern invention, the next example, the 'invasion of the schoolies', demonstrates that it is not just a British, or indeed European, issue.

Invasion of the schoolies

Surfers Paradise, located in the centre of the Gold Coast region of Queensland, grew from a quiet seaside town in the 1960s to become the Australian mecca for young tourists. It is an international resort renowned for its nightlife. At the time of Homel et al's (1997) research there were 187 licensed premises in the area and 22 nightclubs in the small central business district, and the problem of alcohol related disorder was widely acknowledged.

One aspect of this was the identification of Surfers Paradise with the annual 'schoolies invasion'. In Australia, the end of the school year regularly sees thousands of school leavers ('schoolies') descend on

coastal resorts to celebrate (Scott 2006).⁽⁵⁾ Gold Coast resorts like Surfers Paradise are particularly favoured and indeed to a large extent promote themselves as catering for young singles.

In late November and early December 2002 a succession of schoolies from Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria took over resorts like Surfers Paradise, resulting in drink-related public disorder problems that spilt over into vandalism and violence. For example, on Friday night, 22 November, 67 people were arrested, mainly for assaults and disorderly conduct. This resulted in concern among locals and other holidaymakers, provoked claims that films such as the hit teen movie *Blurred* had encouraged the behaviour, and led to calls for the tourist industry that actively promoted the resorts to school leavers to fund crime reduction initiatives.⁽⁶⁾ This resulted in a crime and safety audit and action plan in 2003.⁽⁷⁾

While clearly the initiatives described by Homel et al (1997) did not have a long term impact, they are worth revisiting, both because they demonstrate that a broad menu of policing initiatives can impact upon public disorder, and because the research identifies the limitations to such initiatives.

Fundamental to the situation on Surfers Paradise is acceptance that different constituencies have different perceptions of risk. Local residents were concerned about public disorder, with almost three quarters

(5) See for example: <http://www.schoolies.com/what-is-schoolies>, accessed 25/06/16
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3329849/Schoolies-carnage-continues-Australia-wild-photos-emerge-social-media.html>, accessed 25/06/16
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=guL4yxSDy-4>, accessed 25/06/16

(6) David Fickling in Surfers Paradise, Guardian, November 29, 2003, accessed 25/05/16 at www.guardian.co.uk/australia/story/0,12070,1095896,00.html
 The following sources were also used here. Accessed 21/11/03, they are no longer available on the internet:
<http://entertainment.news.com.au/common/print-page/0,6164,5517703%5E7485%5E%5Enbv,00.html>
www.themercury.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5936,5544472%255E421,00.html
<http://townsvillebulletin.news.com.au/print-page/0,5942,5438850,00.html>
http://www.goldcoast.qld.gov.au/t_news_item.asp?PID=2303&status=Archived

(7) <http://www.goldcoast.qld.gov.au/crime-safety-profile-of-surfers-paradise-6066.html>, accessed 25/06/16

concerned at lack of safety at night and at public drunkenness, a view echoed by many retailers who had relocated elsewhere. However, owners of the pubs and clubs in the area saw the image of Surfers Paradise as the night-time leisure capital of Queensland as crucial to their success. The initiative therefore aimed to draw these various constituencies into an alliance, whereby a reduction in antisocial behaviour would be seen to benefit all those concerned. The mechanism whereby this was to be achieved involved the creation of a multi-agency partnership incorporating licensees, local government, police, health and the public to focus on:

‘(T)he way licensed venues are managed (particularly those that cater to large numbers of young people); the “re-education” of patrons concerning their role as consumers of “quality hospitality”; and attention to situational factors, including serving practices, that promote intoxication and violent confrontations’ (Hemel et al 1997, 266).

Specific examples included:

- Security audits, using police and security firms’ data and observational approaches.
- Registration and training of security personnel.
- Joint patrols by police and private security personnel.
- A shuttle bus service to enable patrons to leave the area safely.
- Neighbourhood watch.
- The creation of a Venue Management Task Group and separate Monitoring Committee.

The latter were seen by the evaluation team as crucial. The Venue Management Task Group was important in promoting standards whereby pubs/clubs would operate in ways that reduced the risk of alcohol-related disorder. For example: low alcohol drinks were promoted at discounted prices, rather than Happy Hours; problem drinking on the premises was better controlled; the availability and quality of food was improved; and there were restrictions on size and strength of drinks. Where licensees were seen not to be complying with this model, they were brought before a peer-based Monitoring Committee, which aimed to achieve a resolution that was acceptable to all parties. The police and licensing authorities were not represented on the

committee, but the Monitoring Committee referred on cases that could not be resolved voluntarily.

Hemel et al (1997) reported an impressive short term impact for the initiative, both in terms of outputs and outcomes. Licensees were assessed as operating according to the new standards, and the extent of alcohol-related disorder reduced appreciably in the first year of the initiative. However, a year later, problems were resurfacing, which the researchers to a large extent attributed to the reduced effectiveness of the Monitoring Committee. They argued that the initiative succeeded in that local communities came to recognise that it was in their interests to move away from cut-throat competition based around excessive alcohol discounting and towards upmarketing the resort, and that empowering these constituencies provided the most effective forum for achieving this, but that the withdrawal of central funding and a move to empower the Venue Management Task Group contributed to individual licensees flouting the rules in the interests of short-term profits. As a result, by 2002 local people were once again calling on the police to win back the streets.

Certainly, the evaluation by Hemel and his colleagues suggests that partnership work to enhance policing of public alcohol-related disorder can be effective. However, given the short term impact of the initiative it is worth considering how the initiative might have been improved. One aspect, for example, which is surprisingly absent from the discussion, is the impact that physical situational crime reduction measures such as improved street lighting and CCTV might have had on creating safer public space (Mawby 2014). Most importantly, though, the initiative appears to have ignored the infrastructure within which Surfers Paradise was, and continued to be, marketed as the place young people went for alcohol, sex and drugs. If tourists are encouraged to go to a venue for its night-time economy, and then told when they arrive that it would be better if they behaved differently, resistance is scarcely surprising. If licensed premises on the Gold Coast are to promote more responsible night-time leisure pursuits this needs to be reflected in the ways in which areas like Surfers Paradise are marketed.

Responding to Amsterdam's liberal identity

The questions raised for public order by Amsterdam's reputation as the European capital of sex and drugs tourism, on the face of it, appear somewhat different. However, where the result is that young males are attracted to the streets of the Netherlands' capital city, similar problems arise.

Both sex tourism and drug tourists can be defined either narrowly or widely. In the former case, tourists may choose a particular holiday in a particular location in order to engage in sexual activity as a major part of their holiday, or (as for schoolies on the Gold Coast) or young British tourists holidaying in Spain (Andrews 2011) they may see sex as an important, but by no means necessary, ingredient (Jones 2001). Similarly, one might distinguish between drug tourists who are attracted to the area by the local culture, of which drug use is an intricate part, and those who are attracted exclusively by the opportunity to use drugs (Uriely and Belhassen 2005).

The expansion of foreign tourism and increased migration of impoverished women from poorer to more affluent societies have combined to fuel an expansion in sex tourism and tourist destinations defined by sex tourism. Amsterdam is a case in point. While prostitution in the city has been long established (Boutellier 1991; Brants 1998) and has been encouraged by what Brants calls the 'fine art of regulated tolerance', sex tourism is a comparatively recent phenomenon (Nijman 1999) but one that is crucial to Amsterdam's (and the Netherlands') income from tourism (Carter 2000; Dahles 1998; Wonders and Michalowski 2001). However, the way that sex tourism develops in different societies is moulded by the structure and culture of the host (Carter 2000), as Wonders and Michalowski (2001) note in a comparison of Amsterdam and Havana.

While drug tourism is also associated with South America, and Asia (Uriely and Belhassen 2005; Valdez and Sifaneck 1997), nowhere is the association between drugs and tourism more evident than in the Netherlands. As Nijman (1999) explains, this is relatively recent and somewhat contrived, with Amsterdam now holding many of the characteristics of an alternative lifestyle theme park.

According to Gemert and Verbraeck (1994, 156):

'By the early 1970s, Amsterdam had become a mecca for students, tourists and dropouts; the National Monument at the Dam square became a popular gathering place for hash-smoking "hippies".'

While drug use is illegal in the Netherlands, the policy of 'expediency' allows key players in the local law enforcement system to enforce the laws differently. In Amsterdam and other larger cities, this has resulted in the condoning of the sale of soft drugs in the 'coffee shops'. Jansen (1994) reported that in the early 1990s some 1,000 coffee shops in the Netherlands, and about 300 in Amsterdam, were openly selling hashish. Many of these specialised in providing marijuana for tourists. Policy changes mean that marijuana can only be purchased and smoked within coffee shops and there are now about 200 licensed coffee shops in Amsterdam (Ross 2015).⁽⁸⁾ In particular, the Damstraat district, at the heart of tourism in the city, became established as the main location for purchasing hashish and the centre of the coffee shop phenomenon (Gemert and Verbraeck 1994). Nevertheless, hard drugs had become increasingly available in the area, with tourists creating much of the demand.

The precise relationship between tourism and drug use was examined in some detail by Korf (1994). He argued that the spread of illicit drug use was primarily associated with youth tourism. Indeed, until the mid-1970s the majority of arrests by the Amsterdam Narcotic Squad were of foreigners. The first drug tourists were mainly 'hippies', using cannabis and psychedelic drugs like LSD. The liberal policy of the Dutch government towards soft drugs, the provision of early support programmes, and a more sympathetic approach to treatment for addicts (compared with neighbouring Germany), encouraged foreign visitors in search of either supplies or help. However, by the early 1980s, the Dutch government, concerned that its policies were attracting foreign users, shifted emphasis: policing of foreign dealers was increased and methadone programmes made less accessible to foreign nationals.

With regard to crime, Korf (1994) found that most of his sample of drug users were significantly involved in

⁽⁸⁾ <http://www.amsterdam.info/coffeeshops/>, accessed 25/06/16;
<http://www.amsterdam.info/drugs/>, accessed 25/06/16

additional illegal activities as a means of supporting their habit. Nevertheless, a minority of this was property crime, with the drug business and sex markets providing the main sources of income. However, he noted that property crimes were more common in the main tourist season, suggesting that tourists may be targeted by drug users. Drug tourism may thus impact upon the likelihood of tourists becoming the victims of property crimes like robbery and theft from the person.

However, it seems to have been the impact of drug (and possibly sex) tourism on public order that has provoked a reaction to this tourism-generated identity from Amsterdammers (Nijman 1999), paralleling a move, in recent years, towards less liberal criminal justice policies. This incorporates the partial abandonment of 'limitless tolerance' towards a 'two track policy' in which the interests of society are considered alongside those of the drug user. According to this, drug users would receive some well-defined assistance and would not be targeted by the police, unless they were seen to cause nuisances for their environment (Horstink-von Meyenfeldt 1996; Lemmens and Garretsen 1998; Leuw and Marshall 1994). It may thus be that the nature of drug tourism in Amsterdam will change. However, current estimates are that drug tourism significantly contributes to tourism revenue (Ross 2015). A similar situation applies to the sex industry.

Faliraki as the sex, drugs and alcohol destination for young people from Britain.

Faliraki is located in the north east of Rhodes. It is a small town, with all the bars and clubs being concentrated into two streets, each approximately 500 yards long and running at right angles to one another. One street consists of bars while the other houses the clubs. The capacity is approximately 8,000–10,000 and the clientele is almost exclusively young (16-25) British nationals. The clubs and bars are generally owned and/or managed by Greek nationals, but many of the staff are from the U.K.

Until the end of the sixties, Faliraki was just another agricultural area. Then at the beginning of the seventies and in common with many Mediterranean resorts, Faliraki started to attract more and more

tourists from across Europe. ⁽⁹⁾ However, while much of Rhodes has remained targeted at family holidays, Faliraki rapidly developed into a resort marketed as a 'hedonistic destination' (Prideaux 1996), appealing to young single holidaymakers looking for a holiday based around alcohol and sex. Young tourists were attracted by advertisements by such organizations as *Club Med*, with an emphasis on alcohol and casual sex. The *Club 18-30* website, for example, in its 'What's On' section, promised:

'You name it you can do it in Faliraki. Check out SPANK – the ultimate school disco experience, NymFOAMania – get lathered & leathered at the new foam party @ BED club and don't miss ONE NIGHT STAND – the raunchy interactive cabaret – and they're just for starters!' ⁽¹⁰⁾

The advert went on to would-be visitors that:

'Event packages cost approx. £115 for 1 week and £165 for 2 weeks... see your Clubrep for details.'

The problems of crime and disorder associated with this environment monopolised the British press over the 2003 holiday season. However, before focusing on the events of 2003, it is important to stress two points. First, official crime statistics are misleading, even more so in Faliraki than in most of Western Europe. Many crimes are never reported to the police, and where they are recording is unpredictable. Second, crime and disorder problems were evident in earlier years. Yet despite – or perhaps because of its established reputation - Faliraki continued to thrive. The ITV *Club Reps* feature in January 2002 that associated Faliraki with binge drinking and unlimited opportunities for sex accelerated the expansion of (young British) tourists and shifted the definitions of normal and acceptable behaviour. Later that year the *Guardian* featured under the headline 'Erotic Emma: drunk and at risk' a story about the risk of rape in Faliraki, repeating a Home Office warning to females holidaying there alone (Gillan 2002). The *Evening Standard*, on June 28th 2002 reported:

'GREEK police have launched a crackdown on British holidaymakers in the resort of Faliraki on Rhodes after a record number of arrests for "advanced sexual

⁽⁹⁾ The above details taken from www.faliraki-info.com/falinfo.htm accessed 19/11/03

⁽¹⁰⁾ www.club18-30.co.uk accessed 28/11/03.

activity". Four holidaymakers have been thrown off the island and sent back to Britain. Six have been jailed for indecency and another three are being held in custody for drug offences. A senior police officer on the island said: "We have never had so many British cases at Faliraki within just one week. We are determined to clean up the resort. Sexual activity is out of control and it is the British to blame." The drive was launched this week and already 13 British tourists have been arrested. Police patrols have been more than doubled in the town and on beaches. The police spokesman said: "There have been a number of rapes in Faliraki and they often go unreported. We are deeply worried."

However, 2003 was the year in which Faliraki appeared to monopolise the British news. Following the death of 17 year old Patrick Doran, stabbed with a broken bottle in a nightclub brawl, the British press directed its attention at the problems of violence, public disorder, drunkenness and overt sexual behaviour in the resort. Reports included accounts of local police attempts to clamp down on deviant incidents, local reactions to the problems, the involvement of senior police officers from Blackpool in attempts to restore order, and – ultimately - attempts to rebrand the resort.

On one level, the problem in Faliraki is described in terms of the public nuisance resulting from drunken holidaymakers annoying local people, creating excessive noise, and defacing the environment with the flotsam of their nights' revelry – litter, vandalism, and the least palatable residues of urine and vomit. Such public disorder issues were accentuated by drug dealing that occurred openly in the pubs and clubs. On another level, this drunkenness resulted in more serious offences, where it increased aggression and reduced inhibitions among potential offenders and diluted any security concerns potential victims might have held. Pub brawls were a nightly feature, albeit they rarely had such tragic consequences as the death of Patrick Doran. Rapes, involving both British and Greek perpetrators, also appeared relatively common, if rarely reported and even less rarely recorded (Gillan 2002; McVeigh 2003).

The way the resort was managed appears to have contributed to the problem. The bars and clubs were poor quality and the total lack of any regulation meant that the risk from fire was dominant. The absence of trained door staff and the over-riding

demand to maximize income led to there being no control on numbers admitted – indeed the door staff was commonly witnessed selling beer or collecting admission fees.

The style of policing, which in Greece still tends to be para-military, scarcely helped. There was no police station in Faliraki with police being sent from nearby Kalithies. Partnership working was an anathema – when a Blackpool officer on secondment mentioned Problem Oriented Policing this was met with hostility by older officers. There was also no attempt at early intervention or prevention by the police so that if there were early signs of a problem brewing neither the police nor the untrained door staff made moves to suppress it. When an incident required the presence of the police they were contacted but on arrival either did nothing or arrested people without discrimination and providing no reason. There was also no CCTV.

The extent of disorder in Faliraki was incontestable. The amount of crime resulting from it was more contentious. Undoubtedly, though, to the British press in 2003, Faliraki was a 'Greek tragedy' (McVeigh 2003; see also Brunt and Davis 2006), a resort in the grip of a drunken mob. The bad publicity forced the authorities to seek out solutions, providing the next instalment in the amplification process.

In responding to the demonisation of Faliraki, the police adopted three policies aimed at reducing levels of public drunkenness and associated disorderly behaviour. Firstly, they attempted to restrict the practice of organised bar crawls. Secondly, they acted against public 'displays of indecency'. Thirdly, they adopted a more proactive approach to drug misuse.

It had become common practice for holiday reps in Faliraki to organise bar crawls, billed as nights out to introduce newly arrived tourists to the local 'attractions'. These involved tourists paying in advance for the night and being taken to about ten pubs and clubs, where the drinks were provided 'free'. Drinks commonly include a combination of spirits, drunk from a communal 'goldfish bowl'. In some cases, male and female tourists were segregated but then met up at the last venue where the exchange of aggressive and sexually explicit insults was encouraged. While the pubs and clubs involved clearly benefited from this arrangement,

emphasis was placed on the commission earned by the tour reps. Police strategy involved arresting holiday reps involved in promoting 'bar crawls'. For example, in August 2003 five reps, from First Choice 2wentys, Club 18-30, and Olympic Holidays, were arrested and held in custody overnight. In fact, the cases were dropped and no reps were convicted of 'the illegal conduct of the profession of tour guide'. However, the message seemed to get across to tour companies and the organised bar crawls were cancelled or rearranged as bussed events.

By no means all disorder arose as a result of the organised bar crawls, though, and the police correspondingly addressed the problem of public indecency associated with drunkenness. This involved the arrest and subsequent successful prosecution of males and females for exposing themselves in public arenas. In most cases, these were males, 'mooning' in the streets. However, the case that most caught the imagination of the British press featured, Jemma-Anne Gunning, who celebrated her victory in a 'Beautiful Bottom' competition by exposing her breasts. ⁽¹¹⁾

Finally, the police applied a more proactive approach to drug misuse. Deploying undercover operatives, they targeted particular clubs, arresting – sometimes on little or no evidence – those suspected of using illegal drugs.

While these responses were accorded a high profile in the British media, the sending to Rhodes of two senior British police from Blackpool, following a meeting between the police, tour operators and the British Consul, provided a tidy 'conclusion' to the saga, especially given that one of the officers was the aptly named Superintendent Andy Rhodes. However, while the message in the press was largely reassuring, our discussions with the officers concerned suggested that Faliraki has some way to go if it is to reinvent itself as a safe and orderly resort. Nevertheless, by 2015 it appeared that most of the disorderly behaviour associated with Faliraki was a distant memory. ⁽¹²⁾ Before focusing on the future, it is, however, crucial to

⁽¹¹⁾ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/somerset/3164765.stm, accessed 19/11/03

⁽¹²⁾ <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/decline-faliraki-after-10-year-clean-up-2103167>, accessed 25/05/16

understand the past. That is, how did Faliraki achieve its 2003 reputation?

What is evident in Faliraki is that as tourism developed on Rhodes, Faliraki repositioned itself as a destination for mass tourism, especially marketed at younger British holidaymakers attracted by its promise of hedonistic heaven. This suited both the British travel industry and local tourism entrepreneurs. As Jeannette Hyde (2003) observed in a short but perceptive piece in the *Observer*:

'The Greek authorities should be doing some real soul searching right now. Rather than flinging in jail or fining every girl who flashes her breasts, they should be asking themselves how they can destroy the monster of Faliraki in Rhodes that they have created.'

'If the Greeks had not marketed Faliraki as a "yoof" destination, they wouldn't have the problems they have today. You can't say "Let's bring lots of youngsters to our shores to spend like crazy in clubs and bars making the owners handsome profits then complain about the type of business you have created. It's like a lap-dancing club complaining about too many lairy drunken men on the premises.'

'Youth tourism based on the promise of sun, sex and sand is the business they have chosen to go into. Nobody forces hotels to sell loads of rooms to tour operators such as Club 18-30 and 2wentys. Faliraki hotel and bar owners obviously weren't worrying about the problems of policing drunken, violent youths when the money was being dangled in front of them by British travel companies.'

'Equally to blame are the British travel agents who 'dangled' the promise of rising profits. Yet while there is some indication that Faliraki businesses have had a change of heart, the British tourist industry has been at pains to deny any responsibility.'

Finally, the role of the media is important to understanding Faliraki's developing reputation (Brunt and Davis 2006). On the one hand, the programme 'Club Reps' shown on ITV in January 2001 is singled out as the catalyst that led to the increase in 'job culture' in Faliraki. On the other hand, sensationalist reporting of public disorder incidents in the British press in the

following years made overnight, if temporary, celebrities of those arrested. The increased importance of social media since then adds a new dimension to this.

As in *Surfers Paradise*, only if this image can be reversed is it practical to adopt policing strategies that can adequately address the public disorder that is apparently endemic. These are discussed in more detail in the following section, which draws together the lessons from the four case studies.

Policy options: policing public disorder in tourist areas

In considering the various policy options open to agencies involved in policing public order in tourist resorts, I want to draw out five dimensions that have become evident from the case studies discussed. These relate to security personnel, security-related technology, criminalisation, effecting behaviour change regarding responsible behaviour, and challenging resorts' images.

- *Security personnel:* Cohen described public demands for tougher policing. In both Amsterdam and Faliraki a key response appears to have been a toughening up of police approaches. However, as the latter example illustrates, this may be counterproductive where the 'sinners' become 'folk heroes'. Involving other agencies in policing, through getting other key players to accept that the problem is not one solely for the police, was seen as fundamental in *Surfers Paradise*; this comprised both the involvement of other 'police' (private patrols and club door staff) and a broader multiagency partnership engaged in the wider policing process.
- *Security-related technology:* Apart from a noted absence in Faliraki, little mention of this is made in the case studies. While the research evidence is mixed (Farrington and Welsh 2002; Gill and Spriggs 2005; Welsh and Farrington 2002), both CCTV and improved street lighting would appear appropriate in tourist areas where street crime is concentrated.
- *Criminalisation:* In Amsterdam more emphasis has been placed on criminalising public aspects of drug misuse, while in Faliraki 'mooning' was defined as criminal. In each case, a distinction is drawn between behaviours that are acceptable in private space but, because of their impact on the wider environment, are unacceptable, and should be legislated against, in public. However, both Cohen's work and the

more recent example of Faliraki suggest that criminalisation alone is insufficient and, in focusing on individuals' behaviour, may shift attention away from the wider environment that condones, or even encourages, that behaviour.

- *Effecting behaviour change regarding responsible (i.e. social as opposed to antisocial) behaviour:* In *Surfers Paradise* the emphasis was more upon clubs and pubs cooperating in moves to change the environment within which drinking occurred.
- *Challenging resorts' images:* Cohen's seminar work illustrates the dangers of hostile media reaction to the problems of public disorder in tourist areas, by identifying the ways in which the problem may be amplified; in the rather different era of *Big Brother*, the example of Faliraki indicates that far from acting as a deterrent, media publicity may allow problem drinkers the stage to justify their behaviour! Interestingly, though, only in the case of Faliraki do we find some outside commentators raising broader concerns about resort images.

While each of these aspects is important in addressing the policing of public order issues in tourist areas, here I want to conclude by focusing on just two: security personnel and challenging resorts' images.

Security personnel

There have been at least three approaches to improvements in security personnel. Firstly, in a number of countries specialist squads of tourist police have become key features of resort areas. Secondly, other personnel have been incorporated into patrol work. Finally, the importance of partnership working in the policing enterprise has been acknowledged.

The creation of specialist tourist police reflects both a concern for tourist *victims* and recognition that conventional police are not always aware of the relationship between tourism and crime and disorder. In the USA, Muehsam and Tarlow (1995) used a questionnaire in five tourist areas to assess police attitudes towards tourists. In general they found police to be aware of the important financial contribution that tourism made to their communities, and positive about tourism and their involvement with tourists. However, they failed to appreciate the relationship between tourism and crime and were sceptical about the need for specialist training. Muehsam and Tarlow consequently went on to offer three day training programmes for the police to make them more aware of crime related tourism issues, introduce them to

multi-agency work with the tourism industry, and help them develop better skills for interaction with tourists.

Specialist units of tourist police have been established in a range of countries (D'Arcy 1995; Tarlow 2000; Mawby, Boake and Jones 2015; World Tourism Organisation 1996). One of the earliest and most ambitious developments was in Thailand.⁽¹³⁾ However, whereas the internet is a prolific source of data on tourist police units, there has been little written in the academic literature. In one notable exception, Pizam, Tarlow and Bloom (1997) provide a review of police policy towards tourism in three major tourism areas: Orlando and New Orleans in the US and Cape Town in South Africa. All three sites had suffered the negative effects of crimes aimed at tourists and had responded by setting up specialist tourist units within the police. In South Africa, the nationally organised South African Police Service (SAPS) operated tourism units in five tourism centres, including Cape Town. It focused on crime prevention and worked in partnership with tourism assistance units arranged by the tourist industry to provide a 'policing umbrella' of support.⁽¹⁴⁾ In New Orleans a special area based police unit was formed in 1985, concentrated in the main tourist area. Some 60 officers were specially trained to deal with tourist crime. The emphasis, again, was largely on working in partnership with the tourism industry and through increased patrols in hot spots. In Florida, Orange County Sheriff's Department was one of the first in the country to form a specialist unit, the tourist-oriented police (TOPS). Comprising some 60 officers, TOPS is involved in providing crime prevention advice to hotels as well as high profile police patrols. The sheriff's department also operates a victim assistance programme, with an emphasis upon helping tourist victims. Gallivan (1994) provided an account of similar initiatives in Miami, where bad publicity led the police to establish a raft of initiatives, including TRAP (the Tourist Robbery Abatement Program) and STAR (the Sunny Isles Tourist and Resident Program).

⁽¹³⁾ See for example: <http://www.phukettouristpolice.go.th/index-eng.html>, <http://www.phuket-tourist-police-volunteers.com/>, http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/a-night-out-with-the-foreign-tourist-police-in-thailands-seediest-city-704, all accessed 25/05/16

⁽¹⁴⁾ See also George (2001).

One aspect of the development of specialist tourist police has been the incorporation of alternative policing agencies, including volunteers and private security, into patrolling public areas. It is possible to chart an expansion in private security across most western societies (Bayley and Shearing 1996; Johnston 1999; Jones and Newburn 2002; *ibid* 2006). Clearly private security has come to play a significant part in the tourism industry, where resorts or holiday complexes may hire guards as protection. Local governments in many resorts also employ staff who have a general responsibility to support tourists, and this may incorporate a responsibility for aiding the police by dealing with tourist victims or reporting potential flashpoints to the specialist police.⁽¹⁵⁾ However, there is, to our knowledge, no research evidence on the impact of any new forms of 'multilateralized policing' on disorder in tourist areas.

The creation of specialist tourist police has also added to a growing appreciation that crime prevention is not solely the responsibility of the police, and that community involvement and multi-agency partnerships are crucial. This applies equally to the tourist industry, where both the World Tourism Organisation (1995) and the US initiated White House Conference on Travel and Tourism (1995), for example, have urged the tourism industry to co-operate with the police in developing community safety plans. Although traditionally the tourist industry has tended to abdicate its responsibilities, a number of authors have identified a growing willingness for partnership work from, for example, hotels, travel agents and private security police (Pizam, Tarlow and Bloom 1997). The importance of implementing partnerships in tackling tourism security issues is further emphasised in a recent study by the European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS 2015; Mawby 2016). As we have seen, partnership work to enhance policing of public alcohol-related disorder also seems to have been effective in Surfers Paradise (Homel et al 1997). Nevertheless, Mawby and Jones' (2007) evaluation of the Torbay Hotel Burglary initiative provides a salutary reminder of the difficulty of involving tourism bodies in partnership work.

⁽¹⁵⁾ Shearing and Stenning (1996) provide an interesting account of the policing of Disney World.

Challenging resorts' images:

However, while the involvement of the public police and alternative security personnel in the policing of tourist areas is an important element of maintaining order, it is not sufficient. Policing does not exist in a vacuum; nor does public disorder. To assume that the police, even in conjunction with an impressive array of partners, can handle public disorder, in British seaside resorts, Australia's Gold Coast, Amsterdam, or Faliraki, is to place too much faith in reactive policing. British lads and ladettes do not 'happen to go to resorts like Faliraki or Newquay and get sucked into an alcohol driven culture once they arrive. Many tourists choose Amsterdam because of its reputation as a sex and drugs city that caters for the interests of specific types of tourist. Tourist areas, in most cases consciously, build up reputations and actively market themselves for designated audiences. Many workers in the tourism industry are drawn to seek employment in such resorts because they also identify with the image (Prideaux 1996).

Those involved in the tourist industry have invested heavily in their resort's image and thus initially at least have a stake in maintaining that image. Equally, local and national governments also have a stake in the image, in so far as regional or national prosperity may depend on it. The same is true of the opium trade and child sex trade in different Asian countries. In order to successfully police the public disorder that certain types of tourism bring to many tourist areas, it is therefore imperative to change the image of such resorts and, correspondingly, the way that image is marketed. Homel and his colleagues provide an excellent example of how this might be achieved, by focusing on engagement and self-interest: engagement in that

players are brought into the decision making process and empowered to become involved in change, and self-interest in that it is important to develop profitable alternatives, a lesson that appears to have been ignored in Faliraki. ⁽¹⁶⁾ However, the Gold Coast strategy appears to have been a reactive one: aimed at managing a resort that young tourists went to for alcohol, drugs and sex, rather than changing the resort's image more fundamentally.

In many cases this also requires convincing governments. This may be a case of providing an alternative model of equally profitable tourist development. In other cases, as the examples of Amsterdam, Newquay and Barcelona suggest, it may be a case of demonstrating that local people (local voters) are highly critical of tourist developments and see the negative impacts as outweighing the positives.

What I am suggesting is that it is unfair to focus criticism on the police or tourists for public order problems in tourist resorts. Key players in local and national government and in the tourist industry create resorts that benefit themselves and market the resorts accordingly. Tourists who arrive to 'live the dream' that has been commodified can scarcely be blamed. Nor can the police, caught between the interests of local residents and those of tourism's infrastructure, and often with their own agendas to balance alongside these. Policing tourist areas is too important an issue to leave solely in the hands of the police. In this respect, at least, it is no different to the policing of public order in general. Policing public order is a key task of the police, but maintaining public order is not exclusively their responsibility.

⁽¹⁶⁾ <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/decline-faliraki-after-10-year-clean-up-2103167>, accessed 25/05/16

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