FINDINGS OF THE CODISP PROJECT — CONCEPT AND TOOLS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING

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Abstract: CODISP was a research project which aimed at developing tools and concepts designed to implement intelligence-led policing in France. We conducted an in-depth qualitative study of what skills and tools the police possess to make sense of their environment and how these can be improved to address security concerns more effectively. We carried out numerous site visits in police and gendarmerie services of 11 French departments, along with about 500 interviews with personnel engaged in intelligence collection, transmission and analysis, as well as with middle- and high-ranking police officials who use row information and intelligence products to take tactical or strategic decisions.

Keywords: intelligence-led policing; knowledge-based management work; law enforcement governance; European research project.

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INTRODUCTION

Since 2011, we have conducted research aimed at developing tools and concepts designed to implement intelligence-led policing in France. We have done this in partnership with the research centers of the Ecole Nationale Supérieure de la Police and of the Ecole des Officiers de la Gendarmerie Nationale, through the research project CODISP (“Concepts et Outils pour le Développement de l’Intelligence en Sécurité Publique”) that has been financed by the French Agence Nationale de Recherche.

Jerry Ratcliffe defines intelligence-led policing as an analysis-driven approach to decision-making, with an emphasis on proactive problem-solving in lieu of a purely reactive management of incoming case flows.

CODISP aimed to promote this proactive and evidence-based approach to intelligence by investigating the way intelligence is collected, analyzed, and used. We tackle this as a problem in the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of organizations. We ask what skills and tools the police possess to make sense of their environment and how these can be improved to address security concerns more effectively. Our aim, in particular, was to pursue ways in which intelligence can be used as an aid to strategic, tactical, and operational decision-making at all stages of the intelligence cycle, from collection, transmission, and analysis to its use as a decision-making tool. We identify what police do well...
already and how they do it; we also seek to understand how unused intelligence potential can be optimized for strategic advantage in decision-making.

Though France has been the main focus of our research, we have also conducted research in the United States and Germany. In France, we made site visits to the Directions Départementales de la Sécurité Publique (Police Nationale) and to Groupements de Gendarmerie Départementaux in eleven départements, where we conducted about 500 interviews with personnel engaged in intelligence collections, transmission, and analysis, as well as with middle- and high-ranking members of the command hierarchy who use intelligence analyses to make tactical and strategic decisions.

Much has been written in English-speaking countries about the relationships between intelligence led policing and the development of new policing strategies. In France, there is no equivalent of the expanding police science literature that aims to improve strategic thinking and criminal intelligence analysis in many English-speaking countries. Of course, our approach integrates the contributions of this literature, but far from merely translating British know-how for French audiences, we seek to build on practices that already exist in France, among innovative units of the French National Police and National Gendarmerie, with the aim of making these sophisticated decision-making practices known outside the localities that developed them. Our approach also seeks to bring out the co-existence of different métiers of intelligence—different intelligence regimes—within police organizations, which are each characterized by distinct ways of seeing and thinking about public safety problems.

Our results are organized around several dimensions of intelligence work. These include four ways in which intelligence is open to improvement, which are in turn applicable to four stages in the intelligence cycle (namely the development of an intelligence plan; the collection of intelligence; its transmission; and, finally, its analysis and use as an aid to decision-making); five axes for implementing potential reforms; and five regimes of intelligence which coalesce around fundamentally different ways of collecting, analyzing, and using intelligence. Addressing the dissimilarities between very distinct and competing intelligence regimes within the police is a key factor in the success of new intelligence-led policing initiatives and in the success of efforts to coordinate enforcement strategies of different units within the police. Accordingly, our work focuses, in particular on the role of partnership, information-sharing, and analysis in strategic decision-making. We have noted that intelligence co-produced by local security partnerships sometimes makes it possible for participants in security networks to go beyond the exchange of information about particular individuals or particular events or crimes and to favor instead a more systemic deliberation about the social context of different security problems and the causes and dynamics that drive them.

FOUR DIMENSIONS OF IMPROVEMENT

1. PROVIDING INPUTS TO STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING

Intelligence capacities must be used in a way that helps police decision-makers to understand public safety issues in their territory; to select enforcement priorities; and to develop problem-solving strategies. Intelligence must also help commanders to select the most promising problem-solving approaches, in order to ensure an efficient use of limited law enforcement resources.

Improved intelligence collection can counter the tendency of many law enforcement agencies to allocate resources reactively, in response to the most pressing emergencies, instead of preserving certain resources strategically for the pursuit of a longer-term enforcement strategy.

2. IMPROVING OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY OF SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS

Intelligence-led policing seeks to improve information-sharing and working relationships between police and institutional counterparts in housing, municipal services, schools, transportation, healthcare, sanitation, and other services that work together with the police in local security partnerships. These collaborations improve public safety in a number of respects: they bring a multi-disciplinary perspective to
the joint analysis of public safety problems; they help establish information channels that provide the police with reliable and regular access to intelligence from institutional partners; they allow the police to transmit their vision of crime problems to institutional partners and to convey their own enforcement priorities, while taking into account the concerns of their partners; and they permit the police to better coordinate their efforts with those of their partners and to develop new mixes of approaches to crime problems.

In particular, our research has identified a number of ways in which partnership specialists within the police have leveraged their expertise in situational crime prevention, or in educating young people about addiction, to enlist institutional partners in joint enforcement efforts. Partnerships also play an important role in creating buffers or institutional intermediaries between police and residents in areas where tensions run high. Many non-police actors can help the police to understand the concerns and the problems of local residents, allowing the police in turn to adapt national policies to local needs. Institutional partners can also help partnership officials to improve their own local knowledge of crime problems at a time when resource constraints have made it harder for the police to anchor patrol units locally, particularly in the absence of a strong community policing tradition.

3. CASTING A WIDER NET

The police must extend their collection efforts to encompass intelligence from both closed and open sources. Widening the range of information available to the police provides the police with additional perspectives and expertise on security issues, so that they can consider a wider range of options for addressing such problems.

Our research has identified a range of underused intelligence sources. In particular, we have observed that police officers have difficulties seizing opportunities to capture information when they perform a task whose primary objective is not intelligence-gathering. For example, officers answering calls for service focus on their dispatch role, which requires them to manage available patrol units, so that they tend not to take into account certain important information mentioned during the conversation by the person calling for service.

We also found that the police tend to overvalue case-specific information and undervalue systemic information related to the causes and mechanisms of public safety problems. That’s why intelligence that comes from school resource officers or police youth crime prevention units is systematically underutilized. For the same reason, studies and diagnostic reports prepared by policy analysts outside the police—often under contract to local municipalities—are rarely read or appreciated by decision-makers inside the police.

4. IMPROVING COORDINATION ACROSS SERVICES

The implementation of problems-solving strategies generally requires the involvement and collaboration of various law enforcement units and services, since concerns about street crime, for example, may need to be addressed jointly by detective units, patrol units, rapid intervention and emergency response teams, and intelligence units that identify crime patterns or prolific offenders.

According, intelligence-led policing initiatives must integrate and coordinate the intelligence capacities and needs of all units concerned with the targeted problem within the organization. For example, the intelligence plan accompanying a broader crime-fighting strategy often suggests ways to improve information exchanges, knowledge sharing, joint analysis, and an evaluation of outcome. An intelligence plan accompanying problem-solving initiatives also has an important role to play in diffusing a unified vision of the problem and in building a consensus on the chosen solution. Intelligence analysts can orient ground-level actors in other units to intelligence to which they should be attentive, to privileged sources of information at the local level, and to effective ways of working with these sources to maximize the intake of intelligence.

FIVE AXES FOR IMPLEMENTING INTELLIGENCE REFORMS

We identified five ways of implementing intelligence reforms.
1. BY CRIME PROBLEM

Intelligence improvements can centre on a particular crime problem or security concern. Efforts to build intelligence capacities can seek to increase what the police know about particular crime problems and to multiply sources of information and types of expertise.

2. BY POLICY INITIATIVES

Intelligence reforms can also target the implementation of particular programs or policy initiatives such as the designation of priority zones for the deployment of public resources, or the design of local security partnerships.

3. BY UNIT

Intelligence reforms can instead target particular units within the police, e.g. by reorganizing or reinforcing intelligence units responsible for predicting riots or monitoring protest, or by making improved analytical resources available to organized crime units to link seemingly disparate phenomena, or to general staff analysts who must identify emerging crime trends.

4. BY TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT OR TASK

Intelligence reforms often target particular tasks or assignments, for example by improving the way ground-level personnel interview crime victims and witnesses; the way patrol units interact with the public; or the way analysts process information about isolated incidents in order to detect links between them.

5. BY TECHNOLOGICAL TOOLS AND KNOW-HOW

Intelligence reforms often invest in technologies, skills, or know-how that can help the police use intelligence more effectively. Thus reforms often target the ways in which police design or use software to compile and analyze data or to share and disseminate intelligence, as well as the ways in which police and their institutional partners format and process incident reports.

FIVE REGIMES OF INTELLIGENCE

In order to improve intelligence operations, the command hierarchy must recognize the fundamental differences between five branches or regimes of law enforcement intelligence. Each of these five intelligence regimes has its virtues and its blind spots. Our project sought to identify them and to investigate the conditions under which they operate at cross-purposes to each other and the ways they can be coordinated to complement each other, once intelligence priorities and the relevant branches of intelligence have been selected.

Our examples of best practices for the most part have to do with the synergies created by new ways of coordinating different intelligence regimes, both within the police, and in partnership with outside actors.

1. PUBLIC ORDER INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence regime targets information about protest movements, terrorism, riots, or other forms of violence (such as gang warfare) that may call into question the ability of the police to maintain order in the public realm.

The main intelligence objectives include identifying and monitoring potential threats in public areas; preventing violence; predicting how large a police presence will be necessary to maintain or restore order; as well as disrupting terrorist plots and preventing terrorist attacks.

The time horizon of this intelligence regime is oriented towards the future and its emphasis is on prediction and prevention, requiring close cooperation between intelligence units and rapid intervention teams.

2. CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence regime targets crime and tracks those who have committed crimes in the past, or who may be committing crimes on an ongoing basis. The purpose of collecting such intelligence is primarily to gather evidence and build cases against suspects in order to bring offenders to justice and facilitate their criminal prosecution, and, eventually, their punishment.
The favored time horizon emphasizes proof of past offenses over prediction of future ones, and proof rather than prevention, along with close cooperation between prosecutors and detective units.

3. PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY INTELLIGENCE

This is primarily the purview of ground-level actors inside and outside the police, including patrol officers, emergency response units, mediators, social workers, transportation and housing officials, as well as members of the public. Their primary concern is with petty crime, public nuisances, quality of life issues, protection of housing stock and property, and the “feeling of insecurity” of residents in high-crime neighborhoods. Patrol units may be called to respond to serious crimes, but detective units quickly take over investigation of more serious crimes.

Unlike the public order regime, public tranquility efforts are organized around responding to calls for service and intervening reactively to those crimes and security problems that most affect residents’ daily lives. The main values associated with this regime are the ability to respond quickly and effectively to ongoing emergencies; to remove or mitigate hot spots of criminal activity; and to restore public confidence in the police.

The time horizon emphasizes the present, and the aim is primarily to deal with emergencies requiring an immediate response. Intelligence tends to be collected and use for decision-making by ground-level actors, with relatively little time or opportunity check or contextualize raw data.

4. PARTNERSHIP INTELLIGENCE

Local security partnerships also share and analyze information. The partners enact their own intelligence regime, since partnerships function as their own kind of knowledge community. The peculiar characteristics of this intelligence regime emerge from contrast with the others.

This mode of developing intelligence emphasizes consensus, collective deliberation, and participation by heterogeneous actors from inside and outside the police. Deliberations about phenomena of common interest are uniquely collective, open, and multilateral, involving outsiders not only as sources but as fellow diagnosticians of a wide variety of intelligence. In other intelligence regimes, by contrast, police interactions with outsiders are secret, confidential, and bilateral; no one source will know what other sources have been telling the police, nor will privileged partners be in a position to debate other sources directly.

The objectives for which information is gathered, shared, and analyzed are negotiated by the participants. The police cannot dictate the problems around which partnership initiatives coalesce. The police must yield considerable sway to their partners in defining the matters of concern to local security partnerships in deciding the way a particular security issue should be characterized, if they are to convince other institutional partners to assume some of the burden of addressing it.

By contrast to internal knowledge communities within the police, the aim of partnership deliberations is to arrive at collective decisions that transcend the individual institutional interests of the participants; to divide the tasks among partners; to set priorities and elaborate coordinated approaches by diverse institutional actors; to enlarge the repertoire of interventions; and to pool resources, create synergies, and lend reciprocal support in ways that enhance the legitimacy of each partner’s approach to a problem.

There is no pre-established protocol for how to deal with certain problems, since cross-cutting problems that can be viewed through multiple interpretive lenses can call upon a wide range of responses from diverse sets of actors. Time horizons are variable and are determined by the partners.

5. MANAGERIAL/STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

Strategic or managerial intelligence is produced by analysts to assist the command hierarchy of the police in allocating resources, monitoring crime trends, evaluating the performance of police units, and keeping track of police outputs such as arrests and response times in handling calls for service. The prime value associated with this intelligence regime is its usefulness in identifying enforcement priorities and in assuring the most efficient use of police resources.
This is the domain of intelligence-led policing, understood as an effort to introduce evidence-based policing making into police operations, in order to assist decision-makers in developing efficient and scientifically tested approaches to the wide range of problems and phenomena that the police are called upon to manage. The time horizon might be termed longitudinal and comparative, in that the command hierarchy tracks developments over time, projects them into the future, and compares data about the present to comparable statistics from selected time-slices in the past (e.g. juxtaposing the number of cars burned in the immediately preceding week with the number of cars burned at the same time the previous year.)

The primary audience of this type of intelligence is the command-hierarchy itself, i.e. the decision-makers and managers who control the allocation of resources and the definition of enforcement priorities. These decision-makers can include higher-level governmental authorities as well as the police. The primary produces of this sort of intelligence are trained analysts, consultants, and outside experts.

Intelligence-led policing aspires to supply other intelligence regimes with theoretical and practical guidance and to frame the performance indicators by which the actors in these other regimes are judged. Accordingly, the managerial intelligence regime has sometimes been mobilized to coordinate the activities and resources of other intelligence communities, in order to improve their effectiveness and to create synergies between them. Coordination between branches can mitigate conflicts and rivalries among different units that belong to distinct intelligence regimes.

At the same time, we identified risks of poorly linking different intelligence branches in ways that force them to operate at cross-purposes to each other. This was the case in one town in which the public order intelligence unit was forced to do surveillance of drug corners and to send their reports to the drug unit. The drug unit had its own priority locations and organizational agenda and therefore saw the intelligence information as one more demand on the time of their investigators, and one which would have required them to redo the intelligence unit’s surveillance operations, since intelligence reports are not recognized as evidence under the French Code of Criminal Procedure. Meanwhile the intelligence unit had no time to do its own long-term analysis of evolving crime trends, because it was busy building cases that had no follow-up and never resulted in criminal prosecutions.

HOW THE FIVE INTELLIGENCE REGIMES CAN BE COORDINATED SUCCESSFULLY: THE EXAMPLE OF CENON

Cenon, in the western suburbs of Bordeaux, is a high crime area that has been designated as a priority security zone in 2012. It provides a good example of successful reforms along multiple dimensions of the matrix for improving police intelligence, and along multiple axes of the matrix for implementing intelligence reforms, as the reforms were implemented by crime problem (drug dealing and extortion); by policy initiative (improving public safety in priority security zones); by unit (rapid response teams); and by task (revising dormant partnerships between police and other institutional actors in Cenon).

First, Cenon illustrates the strategic use of an intelligence plan to multiply information sources, improve analysis, and link that analysis to an action plan that could help the policer-establish control over an area that had been taken over by drug-dealers. The plan was developed and implemented by the police commissioner in charge of this sector, in close collaboration with his personnel manager; a captain in charge of rapid intervention teams in the area; and a retired police officer who served in the newly established position of delegate for cohesion between police and residents.

Together, they put together a system for identifying and suppressing shifting hot spots. They built a network of local merchants, housing officials, security guards, heads of tenants associations, and municipal mediators, as well as residents who had signed petitions complaining about the drug dealers who had taken over public space. The command hierarchy consulted their sources every morning and used the intelligence about shifting hot spots to put together an operational plan for the afternoon of the same day, to catch local dealers red-handed. A system of incident reports in standardized formats allowed public housing officials and other partners to keep the police apprised of vandalism,
graffiti and violence, which can indicate shifts in patterns of offending, and local officials used these inputs to prepare regular analyses that were archived to preserve institutional memory of sources and intelligence, making it possible to track long-term trends and changes in membership of drug distribution networks, while allowing criminal investigators to assemble criminal cases against particular priority targets identified as ringleaders by the intelligence unit, based on its long-term review of crime trends and changes in the membership of distribution networks. In this way, the command hierarchy coordinated the partnership regime, public tranquility intelligence, and criminal intelligence as part of an overarching strategy that coalesced around the new national policy initiative (high crime security zones) as well as a local problem with the takeover of public spaces by open-air drug markets.

The charts below illustrate the matrices that track the ways in which intelligence work can be improved, implemented, and distinguished across professional cultures within the police:

This matrix can be used as a checklist to be consulted by police leadership in putting together a strategic intelligence place for addressing particular problems of concern to the leadership. The first box of the matrix concerns organizational resources. It asks the command hierarchy to select a strategic objective or priority. The rest of the box prompts the decision-maker to take inventory of the full range of units that could supply relevant intelligence concerning the selected crime problem or security concern, as well as the specialized professional skills available for deployment, and the relevant tools, databases and methods that the leadership may employ.

The second box ensures that the command hierarchy plan for every stage of the intelligence cycle, with relevant units and tasks identified for each stage, from the process of orienting the search or intelligence and making ground level units aware of the information they are meant to seek, to the actual process of collecting, transmitting and analyzing intelligence.

Matrix for building intelligence capacity

1. Organisational components of the strategy
   - 1.1 Crime problem
   - 1.2 Policy Initiative
   - 1.3 Available units
   - 1.4 Specialised professional skills
   - 1.5 Tools and methods

2. Stages of the intelligence cycle
   - 2.1 Building the network and orienting the search
   - 2.2 Information collection
   - 2.3 Transmission
   - 2.4 Analysis and aid to decision making

3. Dimensions of improvement
   - 3.1 Strategic planning
   - 3.2 Associating partners
   - 3.3 Expanding the network of sources
   - 3.4 Managing information flows

4. Intelligence regimes
   - 4.1 Public order intelligence
   - 4.2 Criminal intelligence
   - 4.3 Public tranquility intelligence
   - 4.4 Partnership intelligence
   - 4.5 Managerial intelligence
Box Three lists the axes for improvement of any intelligence plan, that is to say, the key considerations for decision makers to take into account in their intelligence strategy: these include formulating clearly defined objectives and identifying the individuals who will be assigned responsibility for planning and implementation of the strategy. In addition, all relevant partners must be considered and engaged in the planning process and assigned a well-defined role in the overall plan. The network of informational sources must be expanded. And there must be a system for organizing, managing, and searching the incoming information flows.

Finally, consideration of the five intelligence branches requires the command hierarchy to select the appropriate units and to decide how to divide up intelligence tasks and how to best coordinate different regimes. For this it is essential to recognize their very different ways of making sense of reality—and their different action repertoires. Understanding the coexistence of fundamentally different métiers within the police is essential to employing them effectively, with a keen appreciation of the risks of placing them at cross-purposes with each other as well as the benefits of using them in complementary ways that can allow each to compensate for the blind-spots and biases of the others.

REFERENCES