



INTERNAL SECURITY: CHALLENGES FOR THE EUROPE OF THE XXIST CENTURY



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Abstract: This article presents actual problems, related to internal security, which occur in the EU in the process of globalisation in the XXIST century. These long-existing practices of information sharing and transnational police cooperation have accelerated in recent decades. Information travels instantaneously in cyberspace; speedy transportation brings the most distant and exotic lands within the reach of the intrepid traveller, including police officials; the world's economy and financial system are intricately integrated and respond to butterfly disturbances in any part of the globe; crime and insecurity are not limited by borders. Globalisation affects people's lives in many states; the most important needs of each person are needs for security and welfare. Economic and political integration, the European Union being the most advanced example, have necessitated a concomitant integration, harmonisation and cooperation among laws, policies and agencies. In the EU, this now means working in an increasingly borderless Schengen area. This article aims to reveal the major threats emerging in internal security and seeks a proposal, from the law enforcement authorities' activities of overall coordination, priority areas of cooperation discussed, and international communication.

INTRODUCTION

With reference to operational concept, internal security is currently and mostly perceived as covering multiple areas of intervention. Its goal is to handle threats such as organised crime, drug trafficking, illegal migration, human trafficking, sexual exploitation of minors, child pornography, terrorism, gun trafficking, economic and cybercrime, among other, less significant threats, having in common a direct impact on life, safety and welfare of citizens.

Security has therefore become a key factor of living in society and a decisive argument of sustainability that must be based on the inevitable sociability, whose degree directly influences the

level of social cohesion. All citizens aspire to live in a secure environment and to enjoy their freedom. Security is therefore a basic right.

After the World Trade Centre attacks, European politicians realised deeply the necessity of building a real European security policy, shared by the will of European citizens. The Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004, and the London bombings on 7 July 2005, even more robustly demonstrated that no country was safe from the threat of terrorism, and that the most appropriate strategy would be greater police cooperation expressed in joint action (Seniutienė, Oliveira and Gonçalves, 2013).



According to the European Union (2010), justice, freedom and security call for policies of mutual reinforcement respecting, at the same time fundamental rights, international protection, the rule of law and privacy. In this context, it emerges as absolutely essential that insecurity is a concept that reveals a sense of self-constraint, insecurity over the fear of the unknown, uncertainty about the future, and especially, the intentions of others.

We are currently in a process of global change of high complexity, resulting from the profound changes that are experienced with different intensities globally and which largely indicates changes in the economic, political, military relationship along with a profound revolution at knowledge level, both in its creative dimensions and in the aspects of its use and dissemination.

According to Sen (2007) the continuous inequalities in the global economy are closely related to a set of institutional failures which must be overcome. Besides the important omissions that need to be rectified, there are also serious problems of mission that must be faced in order to achieve global justice. The negative trend of the global economy affects our understanding of the world, and compromises the explicit grounds that sustain public commitment to eradicate poverty. This is one of the most serious concerns, since poverty (absolute poverty) and inequality (relative poverty) are primary sources of uncertainty and terrible scourges which deserve to be part of our top priorities.

Regardless of the causes mentioned, some authors argue that in the long term as a result of migration, international communication networks involving economic, social and political institutions, as well as the national culture and identity of all countries involved may be established, enabling a greater articulation of these matters (Oliveira, 2013).

The knowledge society is not free from doubts and this raises a number of questions of undeniable relevance. We highlighted those we consider most relevant as the basis of an internal security policy, summarised as follows:

Will knowledge societies be risk societies?

Access of a large number of interveners to knowledge whose application can cause irreparable damage will not be enough to open

a 'Pandora's box', rich in promises but also in unpredictable risks?

Is the acceleration of creation, absorption and diffusion of knowledge an advantage for the new self-regulatory capacity of modern societies?

Does the knowledge society effectively constitute an efficient platform to handle its own new complexity?

To what extent can the knowledge society become effective (effective and efficient) in the elimination of ignorance, error, fear release, uncertainty reduction and its measurement as a real risk?

The biggest challenge for the knowledge society is to learn to face instability, insecurity and political and social risks arising from them.

In fact, as stated in Unesco's report entitled 'Towards knowledge societies' (2007, 230) what makes some political risks acceptable is exactly the fact that they are 'intentional'. This distinction between voluntarily accepted and passively lived risks is the centre of ethical reflection on inequalities over risk. This strongly emphasises the problem of knowing how to prevent risks without having identified them previously. Internal security will certainly solve many problems of this nature in the context of their practices, both in planning (especially contingency) and in operation.

We're changing the paradigm of power relations' changes at all levels of society, and the redefinition of dominant social groups and privileges' holders, also at different levels, reinforces in a substantive manner the need for new and more sophisticated mechanisms, policies and security strategies.

But it must be taken into account that change is neither easy nor free of turbulence. Indeed, as Fukuyama (2012) alerts us, when environment changes and new challenges arise, often there is a disjunction between existing institutions and present needs. These institutions are usually conservative (reluctant to change) and supported by legions of installed interests opposed to any fundamental change. In fact, what has been observed is that the adaptive institutions are the only ones that survive, since environments are constantly changing.

On top of the abovementioned constraints are also added those coming from fundamentalist movements of a different nature and



characteristics that, in the field of security threats, will encourage movement of considerable violence, using several levels of mobilisation factors which, in the end, will be no less than resistance movements to preserve the privileges that feel threatened.

The major threat is that terrorism can be strengthened by the free flow of information, the public character of scientific debate and discussion in specialised knowledge societies. These are inviolable principles and can, in this way, 'facilitate the wrong use of knowledge', as it is fully undeniable that 'the misuse of knowledge has been a constant throughout history.' The great danger 'is to see the benefits of science transform themselves in harmful results or pure disappointment in a time of great threats' (Unesco, 239).

In this context, 'one of the great challenges that knowledge society will face' is the construction of 'concerted and sustainable forms of peaceful use of resources (including technological capital) to prevent conflicts'. This task cannot be effectively accomplished without mobilising joint efforts of science, society and security forces (Unesco, 240). Education is the key to human security policies and the main tool to encourage the expansion of knowledge society (Unesco, 243).

The inevitable reorganisation of the world in a logic of extended geo-economic areas, requires profound political joint actions of the European Union to be therefore crucial to think about a wider security, demanding for that purpose a devoted set of principles, values and rules covering justice, freedom and the security triangle, particularly by setting a strategic and operational organisation framework and police cooperation within the Union.

It has always been agreed that the state with the greatest military power prevails, but in the present information age, this power may be divided by numerous actors. In fact, changes in the traditional power structure are related to changes in the global economy, politics, demography and migration streams. In reality, as stated by Nye (2012), classical power transition among great states may be less problematic than the rise of non-state actors.

UNEQUAL EUROPE

In fact, over the last decade, European countries have been engaged in the creation of common policies on justice and home affairs, pressed by the need for intergovernmental coordination in fighting organised crime, illegal migration, full exploitation of legal migration channels, drug trafficking, human trafficking, minors' sexual exploitation, child pornography, terrorism, gun trafficking, economic and cybercrime, among other things. However, despite a clear commitment by all Member States to move towards common standards in these areas, European countries still have different approaches to cultural and immigration issues, mainly due to national laws.

Indeed, there is no European common space of values and attitudes towards immigration and citizenship issues. However, in order to harmonise the different conceptions of European integration, depending on the history of each country, the European Commission defined integration as a process that prevents and balances the social marginalisation of immigrants.

One of the core objectives of the European Union is to provide its citizens with a high level of security within an area of freedom, security and justice. That objective is to be achieved by preventing and fighting crime through closer cooperation between law enforcement authorities in the Member States, while respecting the principles and rules relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded and which are common to the Member States (Seniutienė and Oliveira, 2012).

In the so-called mixed migratory flows, and in a more economic view, we obviously found the so-called 'economic migrants'. Although development and globalisation have promoted and improved the mobility of capital, technology, goods and services, they do not truly improve or create conditions for successful migration, increasingly feared by countries with a high hosting capacity.

Currently, everything circulates more freely, except people. Inequalities continue to grow, according to the place of birth, abilities and talents. International migration raises increasingly political protectionist attitudes, mainly from rich countries which represent the highest potential destinations of migration flows.



Mobility should not be seen either as an achievement or as an invasion, but rather as a diffuse, slow, continuous movement that does not, in any way, tend to be sensitive to political and dissuasive measures introduced by rich countries. If rich countries are not able to accommodate and integrate those who are no longer allowed to remain in their own homelands, which countries can achieve this? If we look, for example, for certain western European countries which have built their business models based on open borders and free movement of goods and people, we find that, in fact, this same model tries to prevent, at all costs, the phenomenon of migration through the use of legal-administrative and police-military restrictions.

The complex nature of the EU, well summarised in its motto 'Unity in diversity', highlights the problem of defining a unique model of integrating immigrants across the continent. Europe consists of many different cultures and many different countries. These cultures address very differently aspects related to immigration and integration.

EU STRATEGY FOR A COMMON SECURITY POLICY

Human security includes everything that is 'empowering' for individuals — human rights, including social and cultural economic rights, access to education, healthcare, equal opportunities and good governance. To reduce security to the traditional concept of public order maintenance is not only philosophically redundant but conceptually ineffective in advanced modern societies. Modern security therefore demands a vision and systemic action in which the maintenance of order via a 'curative' (direct repressive action by the security forces) can only be understood as the last resort complement of a carefully scheduled and preventive maintenance action, not only public policy but also social peace that precedes it.

The European spirit we share not only calls for but also demands it. This is the context that supports and reinforces the imperative of a concerted action of security in the European context. Full permanent respect of human rights is expected, whose observance depends, in the first instance, on knowledge and respect for local cultures, on pluralism of the systemic approach to the concept of security, on tolerance of different conceptions

of social justice, and on the availability of access guarantees to information and prompt communication.

This subject matters in which it is not easy to identify multiple 'market failures' and, for that reason, it is essential to consider public intervention in coordination with the requirements of new principles and old values of conviviality that universal human progress claims. In parallel, the availability of security, individual and collective, cannot help being observed, but security must be seen in its wider context of society and only then gain the true sense of top priority.

To this extent, it is worth recalling Chomsky (2014) when he states that the Magna Carta was a huge step forward for humanity, since it 'established the right of any free man — and later any individual — not to be subject to arbitrary charges'. It also established the presumption of innocence, the right not to be persecuted by the state and a fair and swift trial. These concepts are expanded upon in the habeas corpus doctrine. The lesson is clear and its foundation completely non-negotiable.

To European Union citizens, security is actually a main priority. The concept of internal security must also be understood as a concept of sustainable development. The absence of fixed internal border controls inside the Schengen area is indeed an important move for mobility within the European region. Moreover, technological advances have revolutionised the way and speed of communications, also allowing greater openness of our societies abroad.

With the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Union's overall aim is to develop itself as a space that provides citizens safety and better access to justice, necessarily implying the creation of appropriate policies on the police and criminal justice in order to fight all those who prevaricate and, at the same time, a disruption from the purely intergovernmental cooperation.

In this sense, the Schengen convention was created, providing common external border controls, common visa and asylum policy, police and customs cooperation rules and security measures (Seniutienė, Oliveira and Janušauskas, 2013).

As we know, in a world where crime and the underground economy are increasingly globalised, the criminal organisations become



more sophisticated, and face states more unable to ensure high levels of security to their citizens. In this sense, it becomes essential to reinforce police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters at the European Union level. Its role should be taken as crucial to the efficiency and effectiveness of subsequent police and criminal justice systems to fight transnational crime.

It should be noted that the concept of internal security must have a broader concept that extends to multiple and varied sectors in order to address other threats that have a direct impact on the safety and welfare of citizens, including natural disasters, such as earthquakes, wildfires and floods, as well as storms.

A strategy for EU internal security focuses mainly on bringing together existing synergies in the fields of police cooperation, criminal justice and integrated border management systems, ensuring that they can mutually complement and reinforce each other.

The new safety philosophy has to position itself in a world filled with violent disruptions of different kinds, where those of a demographic nature present themselves as particularly sensitive, especially in Europe, within which economic and social prosperity will be particularly dependent forces that lead to the coordination of different contexts of the binomial growth/development, where the assumption of 'natural growth' is seriously dependent on immigration, and where the developing countries assume themselves as suppliers of the key base hand-labour resources. This scenario demands an open position on multiculturalism and reinforces rules for success on that commitment to freedom and solidarity that becomes the key argument of development/growth, able to sustain the levels of quality of life and well-being assumed as legitimate yearnings.

Ignoring such a reality easily becomes a source of dissatisfaction and source of tension as it is stated by Sen (2007: 190), 'negligence may be sufficient reason for resentment, but a feeling of invasion, degradation and humiliation can be even easier to mobilise for rebellion' thus making prevention a stronger and powerful strategy, much higher than repression: security must be seen in an integrated way, i.e. as a multi-faceted phenomenon, in which the relevant topics are presented with different dimensions ranging from the political to the police, from the economic to the social, from

the cultural to the historical, from the military to strategic information, etc.

Therefore, Europe must consolidate a security model based on principles and values of the Union, such as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the rule of law, dialogue, solidarity, transparency and tolerance, essential components in supporting democracy.

Based on the Stockholm programme framework, the strategy for EU internal security should give a firm commitment to further answers on the challenges related to protection of rights and freedoms; improve cooperation and solidarity among Member States; taking this as an absolute priority in prevention and anticipation; address the causes of insecurity and not only its impacts, involving all sectors that have a role to play in public protection, whether political, economic, social or other; inform citizens about security policies and ultimately strengthen the interdependence between internal and external security, establishing an approach of 'global security' versus 'smart security' with other countries.

CONCLUSIONS

There is a direct relationship between immigration and insecurity. Crime has no ethnic, national, cultural or religious origin. However, freedom of movement also benefits crime, imposing compensatory measures in terms of safety, i.e. external border control and police and judicial cooperation. Safety is a condition of freedom, a basic right for every citizen.

Accordingly, it is worth remembering Sen (2007: 225) when he says that the sectarian violence that exists around the world is no less bullying or less reductive today than in the past. Behind the primary brutality, there is also a great conceptual confusion about the identities of people, the I transforms the multidimensional human beings into one-dimensional creatures, adding that natural classifications may involve two distinct types of distortions, but related: the incorrect description of people belonging to a target category and the reinforcement that the incorrect characteristics are the only relevant features of the identity of the person in question (Sen, 2007: 35).



It is necessary to further enhance the development of common tools and policies to minimise common threats and risks using a more integrated approach in order to build an essential pillar in the common internal security strategy. It is essential to build methods of identification, risk assessment and, whether they are natural risks or human originated, the EU Member States will most likely face them in the future. Security policies, especially the prevention ones, must be cross-cut and broaden, including not only police but also institutions and professionals, whether locally or nationally. It is important to obtain cooperation with other sectors, such as schools, universities and other educational

institutions in order to prevent young people from going into crime. The private sector also has an important role, especially the one related to financial activities, contributing decisively in implementing mechanisms to prevent fraudulent activities or money laundering.

In this sense, the challenge that European countries have to face in the coming years is a real integration of different identities, each bearing their language, history and culture humanity, emphasising the principles of tolerance, freedom and equality opportunities to contribute to a fairer and better quality of life for its citizens.

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