Trust and expertise in policing

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In this paper I want to explore the relationships between trust, community and expert knowledge in the context of policing. Taken together, these relationships result in a paradox. The move towards community policing, broadly defined as an attempt by the police to engage with the community in setting their priorities and developing partnerships with community members and civic organisations in order to achieve them (Skogan, 2006a: 28) was triggered in part by the gap that existed between the police and the various minorities during the late 1960s (Williams and Murphy, 1990). This gap was believed to cause violent conflicts between the police and minority groups. The community policing reform was intended to bridge this gap between police and community and to re-establish trust by bringing the police closer to the community (in France, the equivalent of community policing is called '*police de proximité*', that is, 'proximity policing'). However, getting closer to the public is far from being the only way to establish a trusting relationship, as is shown by the example of medical doctors. In all indexes of trust in selected professions, the medical profession generally comes first, followed by teachers. The trust enjoyed by doctors is built on their expertise, which also sets them apart from the community. The community is seldom consulted by the medical establishment, which thrives on its separateness and isolation. There is also an important movement within police organisations, particularly in Europe (CEPOL, 2007), to base their competence and the public trust that would flow from it upon a new police science and expertise. One of the important benefits of operating

from a secure base of expert knowledge would be to insulate the police from external, mainly political, interference in their business — doctors are believed to be free of such interference. This other kind of quest for trust thus leads the police in a direction opposite to community policing and its numerous derivatives, as they actually move *away* from the public into the seclusion of expertise. Quoting an example closer to the police than medical doctors, firefighters apparently succeeded in being both distant from the public through their expertise, yet remained trusted by them.

The respective relationships between trust, community and expertise in the context of policing are thus complex and deserving of more examination than currently believed. This paper is divided into four parts. First, I make some preliminary statements to avoid misunderstandings and clear the way for the ensuing discussion. Second, I discuss three ways to conceive this cluster of relationships in light of the findings of research. In the third part, I discuss how the police can contribute to building trust between themselves and the public and, more importantly, between the members of the public themselves. In the concluding section, I shall very briefly propose criteria for democratic policing.

1. Preliminary remarks

The situation has drastically changed since the early 1980s, when it seemed that community policing held the key to better public policing.

1. Since 1980 there has been an explosion of new policing philosophies, strategies and tactics. In their book on policing innovation, Weisburd and Braga (2006) discuss no less than eight new models of policing that were developed in the United States over the last three decades. To this review of developments in the United States, one ought to add at least two other frameworks that are now being tested in the United Kingdom. One of these alternative frameworks, called reassurance police, grew in part from a particular experiment in community policing undertaken in the city of Chicago (the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy — CAPS). So, not only do we have a significant number of new models, but some of these models are morphing into yet another variety (e.g. community policing morphing into reassurance policing), thus adding to the complexity of present-day policing. If we were to take into consideration all policing innovation taking place in the various democratic countries, the complexity would be overwhelming. (For the sake of clarity, I have tried to characterise the various models of policing that I will refer too in the course of this paper in Appendix I. The reader is invited to consult it).

2. There is one crucial problem with all the new models of policing that have been developed, which has never been solved to my satisfaction. According to my own research in Canada and my review of the abundant literature on police innovation, it is almost impossible to assess to what degree a model of policing that is claimed to have been adopted by an organisation is actually implemented. First, there is generally a limited proportion of the total police manpower that is tasked with practising the new methods, the majority of their colleagues conducting police business as usual. It was estimated, for instance, that one in five hundred sworn officers was enough to form an expert cadre for problem-orientated policing (the small proportion was later revised; see Bullock et al. 2006: 175). Second, there are entire departments that are untouched by the reform. For instance, criminal investigation departments were little affected by the new ways to engage the public, the reforms actually increasing the gap between patrolpersons in uniform and plainclothes investigators. Third, the new methods evolved from a specific framework to transform police practices into a diluted 'philosophy' that mostly served as a public relations device to soften the image of a police force. All these reservations make it overwhelmingly difficult to assess the depth and magnitude of the changes that were introduced into a police organisation that embarked upon a course of self-reform.

3. Community policing was not implemented everywhere and was the target of intense criticism from the outset. Yet there was a police management consensus that it was the standard under which nearly all new experiments in policing had to fall, no matter how imperfectly it was in fact implemented. It was quickly realised that this so-called standard was not even a common label and the initial consensus on the desirability of this orientation of police reform dissolved. Today, there are advocates and critics of every new policing model that is being churned out by the reform factory. Instead of a consensus, we have a situation that is evolving towards a kind of policing anomie.

4. Countries differ widely with respect to their adopted policing system. There is one difference that is especially significant for my argument. In many countries, the public police apparatus consists of a few organisations that are nationally based. This is generally the case with the countries of Continental Europe. In English-speaking countries, police organisations are based in cities or regions and are accountable to municipal or regional authorities. In some countries such as the United Kingdom, the police are jointly accountable to the central government and to a regional body. Countries where the basic police jurisdiction is municipal or regional have as many police forces as there are cities or regions, the United States and Canada being examples of countries that have many police forces. There was a time — in the 1960s — when the larger urban area of Chicago had as many as 1 400 different police forces — each suburb, however small, having its own force. Although the present

trend is leading to the integration of small city forces into regional ones, there are by definition a much greater number of police organisations in countries where the police forces are municipally based than in countries with a few national forces. This difference plays a key role in terms of police innovation. The probability of finding a police force willing to experiment in new ways of policing, particularly in the field of relationships with the public, is increased by the number of police forces operating in a country. On the one hand, medium-sized United States cities such as Flint in Michigan and Newport News in Virginia played an important role in respectively sponsoring community and problem-solving policing. However, on the other hand, large police forces are in a better position to implement a model of policing based on information technology and forensic sciences, because of their greater financial resources. Such was the case with the NYPD CompStat (comparative statistics) model, which acted as a magnet for international police management personnel who felt compelled to make their pilgrimage to New York even if they lacked the resources to implement such a model.

5. There are two kinds of coordination. *Systemic coordination* promotes consistency of action across one organisation and between several organisations with the same goals (e.g. various policing organisations, either public or private). Such coordination encompasses horizontal and vertical operational consistency. There is another kind of coordination that I will call *process integration*. It links different organisations that operate on a sequential basis. For instance, the police, the courts, corrections and post-correctional services are part of a process that is aiming to increase public security. With few exceptions, such as intensive zero-tolerance policing, the various reforms of public policing were initially intended to soften the most coercive edges of policing. There is no point in reaching out to citizens, if it only results in increasing their vulnerability to physical coercion. Nevertheless, there is a sharp disconnect of community policing from crime sentencing. In the showcase countries for community policing, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the rates of incarceration have never increased as much as when the drive towards community policing got into high gear.

The upshot of these remarks is twofold. First, all generalisations about policing are fragile: there are too many differences in policing to claim that one model applies to all police forces and even that it is implemented throughout an entire police organisation. Second, there is no guarantee that feel-good practices in policing will translate into a more humane society. The seeds of community policing have yet to blossom under the segregating sun of incarceration.

2. Patterns of police and citizen relationships

As I just stressed there are numerous varieties of police-citizen relationships. I have tried to categorise them in three fundamental patterns that I will now try to characterise.

Police-led patterns

In all the variants of police reforms that were developed from 1975 onwards, the police retained the initiative. These reforms can be described in relation to four dimensions:

(1) police visibility — the belief that a conspicuous police presence increased people's feelings of being in security;

(2) intensity — the extent to which police resorted to coercion;

(3) externality — the willingness to reach out for external output and to follow up on it;

(4) intelligence processing — the need for basing policing intervention on sound knowledge.

The original design of this kind of reform was to maximise police visibility, to substitute consensus for coercion, to prioritise input from the community and form external partnerships, and to develop alternatives to criminal statistics templates in processing police intelligence. Community policing was to embody these original features and was initially assessed as being a promising start

However, it can be shown that police-led reform patterns developed in directions that conflicted with its original impetus.

— *From Broken Windows to Zero Tolerance*: 'Broken windows' was originally a catch phrase coined by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling in a famous paper published in 1982. Its original intent was to provide an argument in favour of 'quality of life' policing, which was criticised for being too soft on real criminals. This kind of policing focused on minor offences (e.g. vandalism), incivility and various forms of disorder that generated feelings of helplessness in the community. It was argued that such feelings led the members of a community to barricade themselves behind the locked doors of their dwellings, thus making their deserted neighbourhood into an open field for criminal enterprises. Broken windows policing was meant to assist citizens in reclaiming their neighbourhood and to revitalise their control over their environment. Instead of community empowerment, it eventually led to zero tolerance on the part of the police for any kind of civilian misbehaviour and led to a massive increase in the number of arrests. Aggressive plainclothes teams of police began to operate at night and intensive undercover operations replaced police visibility. Active coercion superseded the reliance on the power of symbols.

— *From community-orientated to problem-orientated policing*: Community-orientated policing is a strategy to engage citizens as partners in the co-production of security. This strategy stressing the need for externality is rather vague and short on tactics. This is the reason why problem-orientated policing quickly became an essential ingredient of community policing, although the two models are actually different, as Herman Goldstein, the father of problem-orientated policing, came to realise later on (Brodeur, 1998: 50-51). The insight underpinning problem-orientated policing is that police should not react to incidents, considered one by one, but should group similar incidents together in one category and solve the problem that they raise in one stroke. The key moment in this type of policing is the definition of the problem, which is achieved through the application of various knowledge-based methods by *police* analysts. In his influential book on problem-orientated policing, Goldstein (1990) is clear on the fact that 'the police cannot agree in advance that they

will focus on the community's choice' (p. 71) and that 'police officers on the beat are in the best position to identify problems from the bottom up' (p. 73). This shift of emphasis from community input to police-processed intelligence became ever stronger as the police were conceived as 'knowledge workers' (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). Community-orientated policing and problem-orientated policing are actually orientated in opposite directions, although they are often mindlessly conflated (e.g. the infamous 'COP-POP', which sounds like a glib advertisement for some effervescent police drink).

— *From intelligence-led policing to policing-led intelligence* (Cope, 2004): when he advocated the development of problem-orientated policing, Herman Goldstein expressed his concern that collecting intelligence relevant to the definition of security problems ought not to be confused with processing crime statistics. As he argued, the criminal label of 'arson' may be applied to problems as different as criminal negligence, insurance fraud, covering up a murder, not to mention expressive youth delinquency. All these specific problems call for a different solution. However, crime statistics are so enshrined in police culture that Goldstein wasn't listened to. In many police departments, crime statistics are computerised on a narrow local basis (e.g. an urban neighbourhood) and precinct commanders are tasked with achieving a percentage decrease in selected crimes within a particular time frame. The consummate example of this strategy is the NYPD CompStat programme, which exercised a powerful influence on law and order politicians and on police executives. Many countries have now established so-called 'crime observatories', which limit themselves to the collection of crime statistics and the performance of minimal analyses on the patterns that they display. They play the same role with respect to true police intelligence that public opinion polls play in the study of public attitudes, which is to package complex matters in simple control-friendly formats. Needless to say, the community has no say in these war games exclusively played by police executives and politicians. The *New York Times* reported on 7 February 2010 the findings of a survey of a hundred retired precinct captains

and higher-ranking officers conducted by two criminologists, John E. Eterno and Eli B. Silverman. According to this survey, the intense pressures to produce annual crime reductions generated by the implementation of the CompStat programme led these officers to manipulate crime statistics to produce the expected outcome (Rashbaum, 2010; see Chen, 2010 for the follow-up story). This rather unsurprising finding is all the more significant since one of the two researchers authored a book that did much to promote the reputation of the NYPD's CompStat programme (Silverman, 1999).

— *From 'what works' policing to evidence-based policing*: The impressive growth of evaluative research was the natural outcome of the drive towards police reform. With so many true or pretended innovations flooding the profession, it was reasonable to enquire whether they had productive results or not. The question 'What works in policing' became a rallying cry for many researchers as the end of the last millennium approached. Some of the proponents of the new models, such as Wesley Skogan, were among the most eager to test whether they worked or not. Like the previous ones that we discussed, this trend evolved significantly over time. First-generation assessments were very broad and methodologically unsophisticated. For instance, the whole field of criminal investigation was negatively assessed by Greenwood and Petersilia in 1975 (Greenwood and Petersilia, 1998). As time passed, evaluation research in police studies progressively modelled itself on experimental research as it was conducted in the more rigorous disciplines such as epidemiology in the medical sciences, with experimental and control groups, longitudinal cohorts and various research protocols (see the section devoted to evidence-based policing in Appendix I. It explicitly refers to the medical model as an ideal.) Members of the public may play a part in these enquiries in being consulted on their assessment of a police strategy, but the research itself is conducted by experts who assess the extent to which a practice works on the basis of factual evidence. The community policing practices that were initially tested to appraise whether they were empirically successful are now integrated into yet another kind of policing model in its own right, which is called

evidence-based policing. I will not dwell on the fact that the epidemiological research is presently the target of mounting criticism (Taubes, 2007). Rather, I want to mention the fact that evidence-based therapies do not appear to provide an adequate and comprehensive foundation for medicine itself, where it originated. Evidence-proven therapies are actually small in number and narrowly constrained by the circumstances where they were shown to work. When faced with problems for which there is no or little precedent, doctors who were schooled in evidence-based medicine had either to improvise, a skill for which they had little or no training at all, or to apply an evidence-based remedy to a new problem for which it might be counter-productive (Groopman, 2007: 6-7). Needless to say, medicine is much more advanced scientifically than policing and the limits of testing police interventions to make them evidence-based are much more drastic in policing (there is no equivalent to laboratory animals for policing).

To sum up, despite expectations to the contrary, police-led reform patterns have evolved towards less police visibility in public spaces, more coercion, less external input and an increased reliance on traditional data processing and conservatively defined expertise.

Community-led patterns

Police research is generally conducted on a relatively small scale. However, an extensive research project — USD 51 million were devoted to funding this project — on the sources and consequences of urban disorder was conducted in Chicago at the end of the millennium by Felton Earls and his colleagues (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, 1997 and Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999). One piece of this research involved 8 782 residents of 343 Chicago neighbourhoods (Sampson et al. 1997); another one involved the videotaping of 23 000 street segments in 193 Chicago neighbourhoods (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999). Although Chicago is also the city where community policing was implemented with the utmost care and is the most resilient, police researchers seem rather shy to refer to this other project that was also carried out in Chicago. The insight spurring Sampson, Earls and colleagues to undertake this vast research project was that endogenous collective action that sprang from within the community was more efficient to curb crime and

disorder than action instigated by formal agencies such as the police (Sampson et al. 1997: 918). One of the principal researchers in the Chicago project remarked that the number of yearly homicides plummeted from 151 in 1991 to 35 after year 2000, apparently because a group of black ministers took to the streets to engage kids and work with adults to develop after-school programmes (Hurley, 2004).

The key concept of the Sampson team research is that of 'collective efficacy', defined as cohesion among neighbourhood residents, which is combined with shared expectations for the informal social control of public space. In the research, social cohesion/trust was represented by five conceptually related factors: the positive factors were willingness to help neighbours, close-knit social texture and trust; the negative factors were adverse relationships between the residents of a neighbourhood and failure to share the same values. Shared expectations were measured by asking some 3 500 members of 196 neighbourhoods whether they could be counted on to act in various kinds of situations involving their children (e.g. 'skipping school and hanging out on a street corner'), in witnessing violent conflict in front of their home and in acting against budgetary cuts in basic services (e.g. fire stations). Neighbourhoods showing the highest degree of cohesion/trust and of shared expectations experienced lower rates of violent crimes. It was also found that contrary to the 'broken windows' theory, the relationship between public disorder and crime was spurious except perhaps for robbery (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999). Since the 'broken windows' assumptions are shared by the advocates of community policing, this refutation may account for the relative lack of communication between the community policing researchers and the Sampson team.

A crucial finding of this research programme was that collective efficacy did not occur in a vacuum. Home-ownership promoted collective efforts to maintain social control (Sampson et al. 1997: 919), whereas 'concentrated disadvantage' (poverty) seems to be an overwhelming obstacle to the willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good. These findings underline a characteristic feature of the research on collective efficacy: it is research on the 'what' and not on the 'how to'. Once a key number of structural features of neighbourhoods exist, collective

willingness to act for the common good is an efficient way to achieve social control. The question then becomes: how is it possible to bring social cohesion and trust into a disadvantaged neighbourhood where there is no collective efficacy? Despite their failings, this is the question that advocates of community policing tried to answer and which the research on collective efficacy leaves open. It should also be mentioned that social programmes that made home-ownership easier for the 'disadvantaged' in various countries of Europe (especially in the United Kingdom — UK), did not impel in themselves a drop in the crime rates.

Community policing revisited

Despite the slide of policing innovation into patterns of expertise uncritically modelled on medical science and much less welcoming to community input, some community policing initiatives proved to be quite resilient and are even enjoying a resurgence of popularity. The most enduring of all the community policing experiences occurred in Chicago. The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) began to be implemented on an experimental basis in five Chicago districts in 1993. The experiment proved successful and was extended to 20 other police districts in the following year. The CAPS programme is now operational in all Chicago police districts, with the five original prototype districts serving as a laboratory for testing new ideas and technology. Community involvement has remained to this day one of the cornerstones of CAPS.

The distinctive feature of CAPS and no doubt one of main reasons of its resiliency is that the operation of the programme was supervised from its initial stages up until now by a strong team of researchers who issued progress reports on its implementation every year and thoroughly assessed its results (see the bibliography of Skogan, 2006b: 338-39; special care was devoted to assessing the impact of the programme in 1997 and after its eighth, ninth and tenth years in existence). There was one unexpected finding of the assessment research that received a great deal of attention. Although CAPS worked well in the white and the black Chicago communities, it produced much less impressive results in the Hispanic community, where it was expected that it would work better than in the more violent context of the black communities. Research into this problem showed that engaging the

community was much more complex than originally believed. For instance, the assumption that residents of the Hispanic neighbourhoods spoke and understood English — the language used in community meetings with the police — proved to be mostly incorrect. This finding is particularly significant in today's world marked by mass immigration and great ethnic and linguistic diversity.

The UK has also experimented with innovative models of policing, team policing having been first tested in Great Britain after World War II. This interest in policing innovation endured as the Home Office created what is perhaps the most productive research unit on policing and criminal justice. It was found that although the British police were making good progress in reducing major crimes, it was paradoxically losing ground in maintaining public confidence (Fielding and Innes, 2006; see the excerpt on reassurance police in Appendix I). The British then embarked on yet another new experiment in policing, called Reassurance Policing (RP) (see Appendix I; also see Tuffin, 2006). This development intentionally borrowed a great deal from CAPS. First, it reactivated the idea of engaging the community with a view to improving its confidence in the police. Second, it adopted CAPS' focus on constant measurement of the impact of the police strategy being experienced. Lastly, it renewed with the 'Broken Windows' perspective of targeting the sources of community feelings of insecurity. In so doing, it rediscovered that these feelings were not based on the fear of being a victim of a major crime but rather on conspicuous signs of disorder, such as abandoned vehicles (the deleterious effect of abandoned cars had long been highlighted in Wilson and Kelling's seminal 1982 piece on neighbourhood decay).

It remains to be seen whether resilient programmes such as CAPS or revitalised community engaging projects such as RP will stem the tide of expert policing where the role of the community is essentially passive.

3. Policing and building trust

Setting aside limited programmes such as CAPS and RP, which seem to strike a balance between policing and community involvement, our previous discussions have identified two trends, both of which result in a split between the police and the community. On the one hand, policing reform is evolving towards forms of expert policing in which the reliance on scientific underpinnings is *de facto* — perhaps unintentionally — reducing the role of community input. On the other hand, the research on collective efficacy as measured by cohesion, trust and a willingness to act for the common good did not find that the police had made an important contribution to it. Consequently, we could explore two questions. One question would be how to reintegrate the community into expert policing. The second question has a reverse formulation: how to define the police contribution to collective efficacy. I shall devote my endeavours to exploring the second question, at times also touching upon the first. The research on collective efficacy is not (yet) focused on its policy implications and problem-solving capacity. It identifies the structural determinants that are positively and negatively related to collective efficacy. Concentrated disadvantages and poverty were found to be destructive of social cohesion and trust, which are the bases of collective efficacy. Is there a role for the police in re-establishing trust and social cohesion and thus restoring collective efficacy? This question is not entirely foreign to concerns that spurred James Q. Wilson and George Kelling to write their paper entitled 'Broken Windows'. Furthermore, the place of trust in policing is increasingly seen as central by police sociologists such as Peter Manning (2003). However, the study of trust in policing has not yet received the attention that it deserves and there are few findings that can be presented as definitive. My remarks will therefore be tentative, my aim being more to bring attention to a necessary debate than to articulate a doctrine.

A group of individuals committed to global peace and environmental sustainability has recently developed a Global Peace Index that can be consulted on the *Vision of Humanity* website. These individuals belong to the intelligence unit of the prestigious British magazine *The Economist* and to various university research centres. The index ranks the countries of the world according to their peaceful character, which is assessed through measurements taken on several dimensions. One of these dimensions is safety and security within a country. The first indicator of a lack of safety and security is the level of distrust in other citizens. This level is determined through various measurements,

one important measurement being the ratio of police per head of population. The reasoning behind such a measurement seems to be the following: the more citizens have to rely on the police in order to have peaceful relationships between themselves, the less they actually trust each other. This observation surely conforms to common sense, but as often happens with alleged common sense, things deserve further examination. There are rural areas where the police are generally unseen which are populated with people known to be highly mistrustful of each other. At the other end of the spectrum, when British society invented the modern police at the turn of the nineteenth century, it was not generally described by historians as a society that was experiencing a collapse in social cohesion and trust. What should be acknowledged from this very brief discussion of the Global Peace Index is that the relationship between policing and building trust is never one-dimensional. It generally takes the form of complex dilemmas where we have to carefully balance the elements involved in selecting the best option. I will now try to describe some of the main dilemmas.

— *Varieties of trust*: there are two very different ways in which the police can build trust. They can strive to build trust or confidence in them as members of an institution. We might for lack of a better expression call that *vertical trust* (or more elegantly, *confidence*). Most attempts by the police at building trust are directed at vertical trust or confidence in them. There is a second variety of trust that is a feature of the relationships of the members of a community between themselves. We can call that *horizontal trust* (or narrowly apply the word trust only to this kind of relationship). The crucial difference between vertical and horizontal trust (or confidence and trust) is that only the latter is mutual and implies reciprocity. The police want to be trusted by the citizens but they are generally suspicious of them. Needless to say, the police can return trust in particular situations, as opposed to their professional culture of having to be suspicious.

— *Protectors and benefactors*: some professions fall within the category of protectors (the police, the military, private security guards and so forth) and many others in the category of professional benefactors (doctors, teachers, and, more generally,

service providers). There is one important difference between benefactors and protectors. Doing good implies two parties, the benefactor and the beneficiary, who are involved in a relationship of mutual satisfaction (when things work out well). Providing protection generally implies three parties; the protector, a potential victim being protected and a predator *against which* the potential victim is protected. This enforcement triangle is at the root of the need to make the distinction between the vertical and horizontal trust that was made above. Professionals who provide protection are by definition split between their loyalty towards real and potential victims and their aggressiveness against predators. In consequence, the police cannot be wholly included in the chain of mutual horizontal trust, as they have to be on the lookout for potential predators. This is also why it is difficult for the police to generate mutual trust between *all* the members of a community, since they partake in the exclusion of identified offenders from trust relationships. One thus needs to distinguish, as I suggested, between vertical trust, which is asymmetrical (non-reciprocal), and horizontal trust, which is symmetrical (mutual). The ambiguity of policing in relation to trust is reflected by research. A recent six-site evaluation of the British National Reassurance Policing Programme found that the programme had a positive impact on one of the social cohesion indicators: the percentage of people saying they trusted many or some of the people in their area increased by three percentage points across the trial sites and fell by two in the control sites. This effect was small and statistically significant in only one comparison between a trial and a control site. There was no overall effect on the other indicators of collective efficacy such as viewing one's community as tightly knit and increasing community or voluntary activity (Tuffin, 2006: 3).

— *Expertise and trust*: as we previously argued, the possession of a recognised expertise is one of the major ways to build what we called vertical trust. Upon closer examination, it is not certain whether expertise generates actual trust or merely symbolic prestige. Expertise depends on a process of reconstructing experience to make it amenable to a scientifically calibrated intervention. The process

implies that the expert extracts from the rich texture of experience a few features that are usually subject to quantification and which he or she can act upon. This simplification of human experience — often of human suffering — may be so reductive that the reconstructed problem is perceived by those afflicted by it as being alien to their plight. In those situations, expertise is a source of discredit rather than a source of trust. Psychiatric expertise fell into disrepute for a time for having lost its mooring to mental illness as actually experienced by patients. Despite all the warnings on the crippling nature of crime labels, police expertise is still almost exclusively focused on criminal statistics and communication formats that have a tenuous link with the concrete problems that arise in the field. As Peter Manning stressed in his last book, the police 'communicational system (then) becomes a source of distrust' (Manning, 2003: 230).

— *Police and citizens*: police and citizens interact in many ways. (1) The citizens are police clients, either on an individual basis by calling the police or on a collective basis by making known their demands for service through public consultations and through the constitution of pressure groups upholding, for instance, the rights of victims; (2) They are the prime source of information for the police and it is unlikely that this situation will be substantially reversed by surveillance technology; (3) They provide vital assistance to the police through formal partnerships or through informal networks influencing behaviour; (4) Their role at the court level — as witnesses, members of juries or in other capacities — is also indispensable; (5) They finally act at a distance through public opinion surveys, although it is questionable whether it is their own opinion that is expressed through these surveys. Vertical trust (confidence in the police) plays a fundamental role in each of these types of relationship. Mistrustful citizens do not call the police, consult with them, inform them or become police witnesses, or assist them unless forced to do so. They also tend to savage the police in public-opinion surveys when their trust in them is decreasing.

— *Public consultations*: public consultations play an important part in the generation of both of the kinds of trust that I discussed. Having been involved in many police consultations with the public, I would like to draw attention to the fact that there are two different ways of consulting with the public. Most frequently, what is sought by the police is public *approbation* of a plan that has been pre-established by them without external input. The scope of the amendments that can be introduced by the public to the plan is narrowly limited. In the best of cases, the priorities have not been predetermined by the police organisation and can be amended by the public. These instances are fewer, because the police fear — not always without justification — that their agenda is then going to be set by moral entrepreneurs and would-be politicians within the community.

— *A clash of trusts*: the border between trust and suspicion is very porous and unbridled trust in the police can morph into mutual suspicion among citizens. Citizens inform the police, either because they trust them or because they are in fear of them. There is however a threshold beyond which they end up relinquishing the mutual trust that binds them for the dubious benefits proffered them by the police. The citizenry then becomes a nation of informers, of which the twentieth century offered many examples. Principled historians tend to exaggerate fear over zealotry in the generation of police states. What happens here is that one kind of trust destroys another, and more basic, kind, confidence in the police overtakes mutual trust among citizens.

— *Punitive populism*: much has been said in the UK about punitive populism. Research that I conducted when I was director of research for the Canadian Sentencing Commission (Canada, 1987), that is, long before the problem of punitive populism was raised, produced troubling findings, which have been replicated several times since then (Brodeur and Shearing, 2005). Under the assumption that crime is a breach of security, a sample of the Canadian public was asked what was the most effective way to control crime: only 4 % answered that increasing the number of police was the answer, as compared to 27 % who said that making sentences harsher was the most effective measure (Canada, 1987, Table 6, p. 485).

To the question of where the main responsibility for controlling crime should be laid, only 8.3 % answered that it lay with the police, as compared to 24 % for whom it rested with the courts (Canada, 1987, Table 12, p. 490). For reasons that are difficult to fathom, the public tends to invest judges imposing punishment rather than the preventive police with the duty of providing them with security. When members of the public actually take part in criminal justice decision-making, such as granting parole, they often make harsher decisions than the professionals. It was also shown that the police tend to resist the more repressive demands by the public, such as performing an arrest (Mastrofski et al. 1995). This undeniable punitive streak should keep us from sentimentality when we claim more public participation. It does not always generate trusting relationships. On the contrary, it is now clearly emerging that the most basic 'right' that is claimed by victims and relatives of victims is their alleged right to have the person who victimised them punished with enough severity to allow for 'closure', that is, closing a traumatising chapter of their life and moving beyond their grief. This perverted right to atonement is a travesty of the original victim's rights movement.

— *Asymmetrical impact of police behaviour:* in 2006, the journal *Policing and Society* devoted in 2006 a whole issue to reassurance policing. This issue contains an important paper by Wesley Skogan (2006c). Several studies of police encounters with the public have found that how citizens rated their satisfaction in the context of such an encounter had an impact on their confidence in the police. Moreover, these studies also highlighted that the impact of a satisfactory encounter and of a frustrating encounter with the police were markedly different. It was assumed by the researchers that the police may get essentially no credit for delivering a professional service, while bad experiences can deeply influence people's views of their performance. This hypothesis was tested using survey data on police-initiated and citizen-initiated contacts with the police in Chicago. The findings indicate that the impact of having a bad experience is four to fourteen times as great as that of having a good experience and that the coefficients measuring the positive impact of having a good experience were not statistically

different from zero (Skogan, 2006c: 99). The experience was replicated in seven other urban areas located in three different countries with similar results. Skogan rather direly concludes that 'the empirical message is, unfortunately: 'You can't win, you can just cut your losses. No matter what you do, it only counts when it goes against you.' (Skogan, 2006c: 119).

— *Threats and guarantees:* the preceding remarks do not point to a positive role of the police in building trust. However, the notion that the police can do more harm than good in the construction of a trusting society seems to me too pessimistic, although it is not without foundation in respect to what is presently known. This does not mean that we cannot explore how the police could play a more constructive role. One of the insights of early criminology was that there is a hard core that pervades the most harmful forms of crime, which either embody violence or *deception*. Policing has so far been mainly conceived as a form of counter-violence (as in 'counter-terrorism'), that is, a legitimate defensive reaction against predatory violence. However, this only takes care of one part of the hard core of crime. Deception is not only instrumental in a great number of very harmful crimes, but it is the main factor undermining trust, its arch-enemy, as it were. The management of trust is a complex endeavour in the field of economics, where establishing and maintaining confidence implies the use of practical means that go beyond the cultivation of mutual feelings. Offering guarantees plays a special role in the furtherance of trust. English words such as 'guarantee', 'warranty' or the French word '*garantie*' and its derivatives originally referred to a process of certification of the truth or authenticity of persons (and what they claimed to be), substances, and products. Interestingly enough, all these words derive from the ancient Indo-European root '*wer*', which meant 'true'. This verbal root is the origin of words such as '*verus*', 'vrai' and 'wahr', which respectively mean 'true' in Latin, French and German. As is plain to see, this same root is also the source of 'guaranty/ guarantee', 'warranty' and similar words in various languages. In the same way that the police use legitimate force against predatory violence, could they not act in some capacity as 'guarantors' or

'trustees' against the abuses caused by deception? Needless to say, such mechanisms of certification are already functioning in many sectors of activity (e.g. the economy, the arts and various markets). Yet there is still a vast amount of deception that is exercised at grass roots level in the daily lives of many relatively helpless victims, particularly the elderly. The police could play an important role in a process of 'certification' of micro-transactions and social relationships and thus contribute in a positive manner to the establishment of a more trusting society. It must be stressed that the police are already called to perform such a function at the most basic level of the protection of personal identity.

4. Concluding comments

The preceding analyses emphasise the point that policing has grown enormously in complexity. As they do not point to one all-encompassing conclusion, I would like to just offer a few concluding comments.

I do not believe that the momentum of information-based policing will be lost in the short and mid terms as it builds on powerful social undercurrents that are felt almost everywhere. I would nevertheless like to raise two questions. First, reviewing police reforms over the last thirty years should make us very cautious in our assessment of how profound and enduring the changes really are. Some police departments claimed to have, at one time or another, been through *all eleven models* that are described in Appendix I. One sometimes gets the impression that police departments — like other organisations — are split in their personnel between an upward-moving cadre that is stimulated by all forms of innovation and a hardened thick underbelly of rank-and-file personnel convinced that policing is an immutable routine requiring minimal training and no education of the mind. Second, evolving from information-fed practices that may thrive on rumours to truly knowledge-based interventions requires a quantum leap. The confusion between the data smog and factual expertise can be fatal to a policing organisation.

We have also seen that we were more knowledgeable in the ways that the police could undermine trust and collective efficacy than in the ways that they could promote them. I also have two comments to make about this situation. First, although a great deal of the criticism directed at the police is rhetorical and even prejudiced, I think that we should not belittle the capacity for social mischief of some of the harder edges of policing. The galloping militarisation of riot policing is for me inimical to the pursuit of a peaceful society. The recycling of riot police units into part-time 'community' functions to keep them busy is courting disaster, as it is now being experienced in France. My second remark is in line with the first one. If we had not been as fascinated as we were with the so-called monopoly of the police in the use of legitimate force, we might be in a better position to develop thoughtful anti-deception strategies that would be more efficient than forceful physical action in building confidence in the police and trust among citizens.

Finally, the bigger issue that lies at the bottom of engaging the community is democratic policing. I cannot review in this concluding paragraph all the criteria that jointly define democratic policing and will limit myself to observations that have a link with the matters previously discussed.

— *Police visibility*: the issue of police visibility is broader than deploying foot patrols to reassure citizens. Although police undercover work is necessary to fight organised crime or terrorism, there is no more efficient way to destroy the social fabric of a community than stealth policing and infiltration. The basic core of police visibility is physical: citizens can actually see the police as they ought to, the greater part of the staff of police organisations working in uniform. However, there are other important ways in which the police should be open to the public, one of them being to issue public statements of policy.

— *Police openness:* the notion of openness is problematic. We all know intuitively what it means, but we experience difficulties in explicitly formulating its meaning, precisely because we are so familiar with it. I will tentatively propose this limited formulation: an open organisation is one that is able to have contact with outsiders, which are neither overtly nor covertly shaped exclusively by power. To illustrate the point, most contact

between the police and the public is structured by the power of the police. A police organisation that can receive external input in the context of a dialogue between equals, where there is no hidden agenda, is making steps in the right direction to become an open organisation.

— *Police containment*: the most basic characteristic of a police state is that the police extend their reach so far that they become a criminal/political justice system in themselves. In addition to their traditional order maintenance and crime-detection functions, undemocratic policing systems usurp the functions of the court system and they operate their own correctional facilities. Western democracies are not at risk of falling into such a totalitarian pit — *pace* Guantanamo and CIA 'black sites'. What must be kept at bay are incremental police appropriations of the prerogatives of their criminal justice partners, such as the meting out of 'street justice' where the police are at the same time investigators, judges and punishers.

— *Police accountability*: this requirement is the most obvious and much has been said about it. I will only add one brief note. We are misguided in taking a problem-solving approach to police accountability. Police accountability is not a problem but a predicament. Not being a problem in the technical sense of the word, accountability does not admit of one definitive answer, such as creating a unique body for processing public complaints against individual police and for overseeing security policy. Being a predicament, police accountability is constantly evolving and ways to secure it must be constantly reinvented. Government oversight agencies tend to lose their teeth over time and must be replaced.

There are no doubt other conditions that must be respected for democratic policing to be vibrant. What I said about the four criteria that I addressed should be revised, expanded or rejected.

Appendix I: Policing models

Community-orientated policing

It is defined by three core elements. (1) *Community involvement*: community policing is defined in part by efforts to develop partnerships with community members and the civic organisations that represent many of them collectively. It requires that police engage with the public as they set priorities and develop their tactics; (2) Community policing also involves a shift from reliance on reactive patrol and investigations towards a *problem-solving orientation*. Problem-orientated policing is, in the context of community-orientated-police, an approach to developing crime-reduction strategies. It highlights the importance of discovering the situations that produce calls for 'police assistance', identifying the causes which lie behind them and designing tactics to deal with these causes; (3) *decentralisation* is an organisational strategy that is closely linked to the implementation of community policing.

(Wesley Skogan, in Weisburd and Braga, 2006, Chapter 2.)

Problem-orientated policing

Problem-orientated policing is guided by three principles. The *empirical* principle states that the public demands that the police handle a diverse range of problems. The *normative* principle claims that police are supposed to reduce problems rather than simply respond to incidents and apply the relevant criminal law. The *scientific* principle asserts that police should take a scientific approach to the problem. Police should apply analytical approaches and interventions based on sound theory and evidence, just as the decisions of doctors are supposed to be based on medical science.

(John Eck, in Weisburd and Braga, 2006, Chapter 6)

The 'Broken Windows' Approach

The core ideas of the 'broken windows' approach were presented in the 1982 article published in the *Atlantic Monthly*. (1) Disorder and fear of crime are strongly linked; (2) Police negotiate rules of the street. 'Street people' are involved in the negotiation of those rules; (3) Different neighbourhoods have different rules; (4) Unintended disorder leads to breakdown

of community controls; (5) Areas where community controls break down are vulnerable to criminal invasion; (6) 'The essence of the police role in maintaining order is to reinforce the informal control mechanisms of the community itself.'; (7) Problems arise not so much from individual disorderly persons as from the congregation of large numbers of disorderly persons; (8) Different neighbourhoods have different capacities to manage disorder.

(William H. Sousa and George L. Kelling, in Weisburd and Braga, 2006, Chapter 4.)

Pulling-levers policing

Pulling-levers strategies are one fruit of the problem-orientated policing movement. It emerged as part of the Boston Gun Project aimed at youth 'gang' violence in Boston. Pulling levers (all legal tools and sanctions) or focused deterrence strategies deploy enforcement, services, the moral voices of communities and deliberate communications in order to create a powerful deterrent to particular behaviour by particular offenders. It includes: (1) Selection of a particular crime problem; (2) Pulling together a *public criminal justice* interagency enforcement group (police, probation, parole, prosecutors and federal agencies); (3) Conducting research, usually relying heavily on the field experience of front-line police officers to identify key offenders (including groups) and the context of their behaviour; (4) Framing a special enforcement operation directed at those offenders and groups of offenders; (5) Matching those enforcement operations with parallel efforts to direct services and the moral voices of affected communities to those same offenders groups; (6) Communicating directly and repeatedly with offenders and group to let them know that they are under particular scrutiny… One form of this communication is the 'forum', 'notification' or 'call in', in which offenders are invited or directed (usually because they are on probation or parole) to attend face-to-face meetings with law enforcement officials, service providers, and community figures.

(David M. Kennedy, in Weisburd and Braga, 2006 Chapter 8.)

Third-party policing

Third-party policing is defined as police efforts to persuade or coerce organisations or non-offending persons, such as public housing agencies, property owners, parents, health and building inspectors, and business owners to take some responsibility for preventing crime or reducing crime problems.

(Lorraine Mazerolle and Janet Ransley, in Weisburd and Braga, 2006, Chapter 10.)

Hotspots policing

The idea of hotspots policing can be traced to recent critiques of traditional criminological theory. For most of the last century criminologists have focused their understanding of crime on individual and communities… The emphasis placed on individual motivation in criminological theory failed to recognise the importance of other elements in the crime equation. They noted that for criminal events to occur there is a need not only for a criminal, but also for a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian…One natural outgrowth of these perspectives was that the specific places where crime occurs would become an important focus for crime prevention researchers… In the mid to late 1980s a group of criminologists began to examine the distribution of crime at microplaces… Perhaps the most influential of these studies was conducted by Larry Sherman and his colleagues. Looking at crime addresses in Minneapolis they found a concentration of crime at places that was startling. Only three per cent of the addresses of Minneapolis accounted for 50 percent of the crime calls to the police…The idea of focusing police patrol on crime hotspots represented a direct application of the empirical findings regarding the concentration of crime in microplaces…In policing, most innovation has been developed using what might be termed a 'clinical model.' In such a model, research may play a role, but the adoption of innovation is determined by the experiences of practitioners and often has little to do with research evidence. Such models have a weak theoretical basis… Our discussion of hot spohotspots policing suggests an alternative model for police innovation. Hot spots policing was consistent with developing theoretical insights in criminology and was supported by basic criminological research on crime and place.

(Weisburd and Braga, in Weisburd and Braga, 2006, Chapter 12)

Evidence-based policing for crime prevention

In characterising the evidence-based model with respect to policing, it is important to first define what is meant by the term 'evidence'. Evidence is taken to mean scientific, not criminal evidence…At the heart of the evidence-based model is the notion that 'we are all entitled to our own opinions, but not to our own facts' (Larry Sherman)… In an evidence-based model, the source of scientific evidence is empirical research in the form of evaluations of programmes, practices and policies. But not all evaluations are made equal. Some are more scientifically valid than others. The randomised controlled experiment is the most convincing method of evaluation crime-prevention programmes…Evidence-based policing is a part of a larger and increasingly expanding evidence-based movement. In general terms, this movement is dedicated to the betterment of society through utilisation of the highest-quality evidence on what works best. The evidence-based movement first began in medicine and has, more recently, been embraced by the social sciences.

(Brandon G Welsh, in Weisburd and Braga, 2006, Chapter 16)

CompStat

CompStat is most frequently understood by its most visible elements today. These include: up-to-date computerised crime data, crime analysis and advanced crime mapping as the basis for regularised, interactive crime strategy meetings which hold managers accountable for specific crime strategies and solutions in their areas.

CompStat, however, is a far more complex product of changes in management and organisational arrangements, including flattening, decentralisation, greater personnel authority, discretion and autonomy, geographic managerial accountability, and enhanced problem-solving. Based on the New York experience, it is my view that CompStat cannot be a fully viable entity if the above administrative, managerial and operational activities do not precede it.

(Eli B. Silverman, in Weisburd and Braga, 2006, Chapter 14)

Reassurance policing

Reassurance policing is a model of neighbourhood policing which seeks to improve public confidence in policing. It involves local communities in identifying priority crime and disorder issues in their neighbourhood which they then tackle together with the police and other services and partners.

(Richard Tuffin, 2006: 1)

Reassurance policing (RP) seeks to address the gap between broadly improving indicators of risk of criminal victimisation and declining indicators of public confidence…Through its orientation to 'signal crimes', events that disproportionately influence the public's sense of security, RP is almost intrinsically 'about measurement'. A core practice involves police officers and auxiliaries working with the public at beat level to identify physical and social 'signals' (positive and negative) and marrying diagnosed reassurance inhibitors with action to address the problem (e.g. having abandoned vehicles removed from neighbourhoods).

(Nigel Fielding and Martin Innes, 2006: 130)

Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS)

Community policing is not a set of specific projects; rather it involves changing decision-making processes and creating new cultures within police departments. It is an organisational strategy that leaves setting priorities and the means of achieving them largely to residents and the police who serve in their neighbourhoods. Community policing is a process rather than a product.

Across the nation it has proved to have three core strategic components: decentralisation, citizen involvement and problem solving. In practice these three dimensions are densely interrelated. Departments that short-change even one of them will not field a very effective programme.

(Wesley Skogan, 2006b: 5-6)

Intelligence-led policing

The (National Intelligence) Model (NIM) provides the picture that drives effective strategy, not just about crime and criminals, but for all enforcement needs,

from organised crime to road safety. It is capable of use in relation to new or emerging problems within a force or operational command unit; to provide the strategic and operational focus to force, organisation or local command unit business planning…This work is the outcome of a desire to professionalise the intelligence discipline within law enforcement… It is also recognition of the changing requirements of law enforcement managers which highlights three particular needs: to plan and work in cooperation with partners to secure community safety; to manage performance and risk; to account for budgets.

(National Crime Intelligence Service (2000), The National Intelligence Model (available on NIM Web site)

NIM is an information-based deployment system and a cornerstone for the management of law enforcement operations in England and Wales. Historically most policing has been driven by the need to respond to calls from the public. This is necessary police business but crime and incident patterns are not identified. NIM identifies patterns of crime and enables a more fundamental approach to problem solving in which resources can be tasked efficiently against an accurate understanding of crime and incidents problems. NIM promotes a cooperative approach to policing and many of the solutions to problems will require the participation of other agencies and bodies. It is further strengthened when used in conjunction with other partner agencies, eg, joint tasking and coordination processes, and when it incorporates community information into the strategic assessment.

(Guidance on The National Intelligence Model, 2005. Produced on behalf of the Association of Chiefs of Police Officers by the National Centre for Policing Excellence, CENTREX)

A note on sources: the majority of the definitions consist of selected *quotes or paraphrases* excepted from Weisburd and Braga (2006). This is a useful book as it brings together 17 key proponents of innovation in policing, asking them to define and argue for the model that they advocate. Each advocate is paired with a critic.

The sources for the other definitions, which include researchers in government agencies, were chosen because of their close relationship with the development of a particular model.

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